Telemessage
Products
2- 6 CVEs
- 2 CVEs
Recent CVEs
7| CVE | Vendor / Product | Sev | Risk | CVSS | EPSS | KEV | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-48927 | 0.13 | — | 0.08 | KEV | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025. | ||
| CVE-2025-48928 | 0.13 | — | 0.00 | KEV | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a "core dump" in which a password previously sent over HTTP would be included in this dump, as exploited in the wild in May 2025. | ||
| CVE-2025-47729 | 0.12 | — | 0.00 | KEV | May 8, 2025 | The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 holds cleartext copies of messages from TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app users, which is different functionality than described in the TeleMessage "End-to-End encryption from the mobile phone through to the corporate archive"… | ||
| CVE-2025-48925 | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential. | |||
| CVE-2025-48926 | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | May 28, 2025 | The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers. | |||
| CVE-2025-48931 | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort. | |||
| CVE-2025-47730 | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | May 8, 2025 | The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of logfile for the user and enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO for the password. |
- risk 0.13cvss —epss 0.08
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
- risk 0.13cvss —epss 0.00
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a "core dump" in which a password previously sent over HTTP would be included in this dump, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
- risk 0.12cvss —epss 0.00
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 holds cleartext copies of messages from TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app users, which is different functionality than described in the TeleMessage "End-to-End encryption from the mobile phone through to the corporate archive"…
- CVE-2025-48925May 28, 2025risk 0.00cvss —epss 0.00
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential.
- CVE-2025-48926May 28, 2025risk 0.00cvss —epss 0.00
The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers.
- CVE-2025-48931May 28, 2025risk 0.00cvss —epss 0.00
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort.
- CVE-2025-47730May 8, 2025risk 0.00cvss —epss 0.00
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of logfile for the user and enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO for the password.