Telemessage

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a "core dump" in which a password previously sent over HTTP would be included in this dump, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.

The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of logfile for the user and enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO for the password.

The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers.

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential.

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 implements authentication through a long-lived credential (e.g., not a token with a short expiration time) that can be reused at a later date if discovered by an adversary.

The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 holds cleartext copies of messages from TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app users, which is different functionality than described in the TeleMessage "End-to-End encryption from the mobile phone through to the corporate archive"…

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort.

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 stores certain cleartext information in memory, even though memory content may be accessible to an adversary through various avenues.