TeleMessage service
by Telemessage
CVEs (9)
| CVE | Vendor / Product | Sev | Risk | CVSS | EPSS | KEV | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-48927 | Med | 0.47 | 5.3 | 0.09 | KEV | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025. | |
| CVE-2025-48928 | Med | 0.38 | 4.0 | 0.00 | KEV | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a "core dump" in which a password previously sent over HTTP would be included in this dump, as exploited in the wild in May 2025. | |
| CVE-2025-47730 | Med | 0.31 | 4.8 | 0.00 | May 8, 2025 | The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of logfile for the user and enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO for the password. | ||
| CVE-2025-48926 | Med | 0.28 | 4.3 | 0.00 | May 28, 2025 | The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers. | ||
| CVE-2025-48925 | Med | 0.28 | 4.3 | 0.00 | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential. | ||
| CVE-2025-48929 | Med | 0.26 | 4.0 | 0.00 | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 implements authentication through a long-lived credential (e.g., not a token with a short expiration time) that can be reused at a later date if discovered by an adversary. | ||
| CVE-2025-47729 | Low | 0.24 | 1.9 | 0.00 | KEV | May 8, 2025 | The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 holds cleartext copies of messages from TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app users, which is different functionality than described in the TeleMessage "End-to-End encryption from the mobile phone through to the corporate archive"… | |
| CVE-2025-48931 | Low | 0.21 | 3.2 | 0.00 | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort. | ||
| CVE-2025-48930 | Low | 0.18 | 2.8 | 0.00 | May 28, 2025 | The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 stores certain cleartext information in memory, even though memory content may be accessible to an adversary through various avenues. |
- risk 0.47cvss 5.3epss 0.09
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
- risk 0.38cvss 4.0epss 0.00
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a "core dump" in which a password previously sent over HTTP would be included in this dump, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
- risk 0.31cvss 4.8epss 0.00
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of logfile for the user and enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO for the password.
- risk 0.28cvss 4.3epss 0.00
The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers.
- risk 0.28cvss 4.3epss 0.00
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential.
- risk 0.26cvss 4.0epss 0.00
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 implements authentication through a long-lived credential (e.g., not a token with a short expiration time) that can be reused at a later date if discovered by an adversary.
- risk 0.24cvss 1.9epss 0.00
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 holds cleartext copies of messages from TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app users, which is different functionality than described in the TeleMessage "End-to-End encryption from the mobile phone through to the corporate archive"…
- risk 0.21cvss 3.2epss 0.00
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort.
- risk 0.18cvss 2.8epss 0.00
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 stores certain cleartext information in memory, even though memory content may be accessible to an adversary through various avenues.