Versa Networks

The Versa Director software exposes a number of services by default and allow attackers an easy foothold due to default credentials and multiple accounts (most with sudo access) that utilize the same default credentials. By default, Versa director exposes ssh and postgres to the internet, alongside a host of other services. Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers. Workarounds or Mitigation: Versa recommends the following security controls: 1) Change default passwords to complex passwords 2) Passwords must be complex with at least 8 characters that comprise of upper case, and lower case alphabets, as well as at at least one digit, and one special character 3) Passwords must be changed at least every 90 days 4) Password change history is checked to ensure that the at least the last 5 passwords must be used when changing password. 5) Review and audit logs for all authentication attempts to check for unauthorized/suspicious login attempts and enforce remediation steps.

The Versa Director SD-WAN orchestration platform which makes use of Cisco NCS application service. Active and Standby Directors communicate over TCP ports 4566 and 4570 to exchange High Availability (HA) information using a shared password. Affected versions of Versa Director bound to these ports on all interfaces. An attacker that can access the Versa Director could access the NCS service on port 4566 and exploit it to perform unauthorized administrative actions and perform remote code execution. Customers are recommended to follow the hardening guide. Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers.

Versa SASE Client for Windows versions released between 7.8.7 and 7.9.4 contain a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the audit log export functionality. The client communicates user-controlled file paths to a privileged service, which performs file system operations without impersonating the requesting user. Due to improper privilege handling and a time-of-check time-of-use race condition combined with symbolic link and mount point manipulation, a local authenticated attacker can coerce the service into deleting arbitrary directories with SYSTEM privileges. This can be exploited to delete protected system folders such as C:\\Config.msi and subsequently achieve execution as NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM via MSI rollback techniques.

The Versa Director SD-WAN orchestration platform provides direct web-based access to uCPE virtual machines through the Director GUI. By default, the websockify service is exposed on port 6080 and accessible from the internet. This exposure introduces significant risk, as websockify has known weaknesses that can be exploited, potentially leading to remote code execution. Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers. Workarounds or Mitigation: Restrict access to TCP port 6080 if uCPE console access is not necessary. Versa recommends that Director be upgraded to one of the remediated software versions.

The Versa Director SD-WAN orchestration platform includes a Webhook feature for sending notifications to external HTTP endpoints. However, the "Add Webhook" and "Test Webhook" functionalities can be abused by an authenticated user to send crafted HTTP requests to localhost. This can be leveraged to execute commands on behalf of the versa user, who has sudo privileges, potentially leading to privilege escalation or remote code execution. Exploitation Status: Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers. Workarounds or Mitigation: There are no workarounds to disable the GUI option. Versa recommends that Director be upgraded to one of the remediated software versions.

The Versa Director SD-WAN orchestration platform provides an option to upload various types of files. The Versa Director does not correctly limit file upload permissions. The UI appears not to allow file uploads but uploads still succeed. In addition, the Versa Director discloses the full filename of uploaded temporary files, including the UUID prefix. Insecure UCPE image upload in Versa Director allows an authenticated attacker to upload a webshell. Exploitation Status: Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers. Workarounds or Mitigation: There are no workarounds to disable the GUI option. Versa recommends that Director be upgraded to one of the remediated software versions.

The Versa Director SD-WAN orchestration platform includes functionality to initiate SSH sessions to remote CPEs and the Director shell via Shell-In-A-Box. The underlying Python script, shell-connect.py, is vulnerable to command injection through the user argument. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the system. Exploitation Status: Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers. Workarounds or Mitigation: There are no workarounds to disable the GUI option. Versa recommends that Director be upgraded to one of the remediated software versions.

The Versa Director SD-WAN orchestration platform provides functionality to upload various types of files. However, the Java code handling file uploads contains an argument injection vulnerability. By appending additional arguments to the file name, an attacker can bypass MIME type validation, allowing the upload of arbitrary file types. This flaw can be exploited to place a malicious file on disk. Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers. There are no workarounds to disable the GUI option. Versa recommends that Director be upgraded to one of the remediated software versions.

The Versa Director SD-WAN orchestration platform allows customization of the user interface, including the header, footer, and logo. However, the input provided for these customizations is not properly validated or sanitized, allowing a malicious user to inject and store cross-site scripting (XSS) payloads. Exploitation Status: Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers. Workarounds or Mitigation: There are no workarounds to disable the GUI option. Versa recommends that Director be upgraded to one of the remediated software versions.

The Versa Director SD-WAN orchestration platform implements Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) using One-Time Passcodes (OTP) delivered via email or SMS. Versa Director accepts untrusted user input when dispatching 2FA codes, allowing an attacker who knows a valid username and password to redirect the OTP delivery (SMS/email) to their own device. OTP/TOTP codes are not invalidated after use, enabling reuse by an attacker who has previously intercepted or obtained a valid code. In addition, the 2FA system does not adequately restrict the number or frequency of login attempts. The OTP values are generated from a relatively small keyspace, making brute-force attacks more feasible. Exploitation Status: Versa Networks is not aware of any reported instance where this vulnerability was exploited. Proof of concept for this vulnerability has been disclosed by third party security researchers. Workarounds or Mitigation: Versa recommends that Director be upgraded to one of the remediated software versions.