Rucio

### Summary A SQL injection vulnerability exists in Rucio versions 1.30.0 and later before 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1, in `FilterEngine.create_postgres_query()`. This allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search`). When the `postgres_meta` metadata plugin is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL strings via Python `.format()`, then passed to `psycopg3`'s `sql.SQL()` which treats the string as trusted SQL syntax. Depending on the database privileges assigned to the service account, exploitation can expose sensitive tables, modify or delete metadata, access server-side files, or achieve code execution through PostgreSQL features such as COPY ... FROM PROGRAM. This issue affects deployments that explicitly use the postgres_meta metadata plugin. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1.

A SQL injection vulnerability in `FilterEngine.create_sqla_query()` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search`). On Oracle deployments attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into `sqlalchemy.text()` via Python `.format()`, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. This affects versions 1.27.0 and later before 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1. The vulnerability exists in `lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py` within the `create_sqla_query()` method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using `text()` with Python string formatting. Both `key` and `value` are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The `text()` function creates a raw SQL fragment — it does **not** escape or parameterize its contents. Any authenticated Rucio user can exploit this through the DID search API to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database. This can expose all managed data identifiers and sensitive tables such as identities, tokens, accounts, rse_settings, and rules, and may allow modification of database contents. The issue affects Oracle deployments using the default json_meta plugin and does not affect PostgreSQL or MySQL deployments using that plugin. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1.

Rucio is a software framework that provides functionality to organize, manage, and access large volumes of scientific data using customizable policies. The common Rucio helm-charts for the `rucio-server`, `rucio-ui`, and `rucio-webui` define the log format for the apache access log of these components. The `X-Rucio-Auth-Token`, which is part of each request header sent to Rucio, is part of this log format. Thus, each access log line potentially exposes the credentials (Internal Rucio token, or JWT in case of OIDC authentication) of the user. Due to the length of the token (Especially for a JWT) the tokens are often truncated, and thus not usable as credential; nevertheless, the (partial) credential should not be part of the logfile. The impact of this issue is amplified if the access logs are made available to a larger group of people than the instance administrators themselves. An updated release has been supplied for the `rucio-server`, `rucio-ui` and `rucio-webui` helm-chart. The change was also retrofitted for the currently supported Rucio LTS releases. The patched versions are rucio-server 37.0.2, 35.0.1, and 32.0.1; rucio-ui 37.0.4, 35.0.1, and 32.0.2; and rucio-webui 37.0.2, 35.1.1, and 32.0.1. As a workaround, one may update the `logFormat` variable and remove the `X-Rucio-Auth-Token`.