PraisonAI

# AgentOS remains unauthenticated after GHSA-pm96 patched version and allows remote agent invocation ## Summary PraisonAI's `AgentOS` FastAPI deployment surface remains unauthenticated in current main and in releases after the published patched version for…

# PraisonAI `AgentTeam.launch()` exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints ## Summary PraisonAI's documented Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication…

### Summary Setting `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` completely disables all authentication on the `/api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke` endpoint. This bypass is advertised in the application's own error messages, making it likely to appear in production Docker and Compose configurations. …

### Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the SearxNG / `search_web` search tools allows an attacker to make the server perform requests to arbitrary internal endpoints and read the responses back. The `searxng_url` argument is passed directly to…

## Summary PraisonAI's template loader accepts GitHub template URIs with refs, for example `github:owner/repo/[email protected]`. The resolver stores the user-controlled template path and ref verbatim, and the cache layer later joins those values into…

# PraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary ## Summary PraisonAI Code's agent-compatible `CODE_TOOLS` wrappers keep a global workspace root initialized to `None`. If an application uses `CODE_TOOLS`, `code_read_file`, `code_search_replace`, or…

The WhatsApp and Linear bot adapters verify the inbound webhook HMAC signature only when a secret is configured. When the secret environment variable is unset — the default on a fresh install and common in development — verification is skipped entirely and the webhook body…

### Summary A workspace member can permanently delete any resource — projects, agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, and issue-label attachments — created by the workspace owner or other members. All six content DELETE endpoints enforce workspace membership but perform…

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the `agent_file` field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs. ### Details The…

# PraisonAI `recipe.run_stream()` skips dangerous-tool policy enforcement ## Summary PraisonAI recipe execution blocks default-denied dangerous tools unless the caller explicitly passes `allow_dangerous_tools=True`. The normal `recipe.run()` path enforces this with…

# HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools ## Summary `praisonai.bots.HTTPApproval` renders pending tool approval arguments directly into the approval dashboard HTML. An attacker-controlled tool argument…

# PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when `LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is missing ## Summary PraisonAI's LinearBot starts a public webhook listener on `0.0.0.0` and treats `LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET` as optional. When the secret is absent, startup only logs a warning and…

# PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage ## Summary PraisonAI's Dynamic Context Discovery feature exposes artifact helper tools through `ctx.get_tools()`: ```python ctx = setup_dynamic_context() agent = Agent( …

# PraisonAI Slack `app_mention` bypasses configured user/channel authorization ## Summary PraisonAI's Slack bot applies its configured `allowed_users`, `allowed_channels`, and unknown-user pairing policy in the normal Slack `message` event handler, but not in the adjacent…

# PraisonAI `recipe serve` Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guard ## Summary PraisonAI's installed console entrypoint is Typer-first. In current releases, the `recipe` command is registered in the Typer app and `praisonai recipe serve` dispatches to the…

# PraisonAI ToolsMCPServer legacy SSE transport accepts attacker Host/Origin and exposes registered tools ## Summary `praisonaiagents.mcp.ToolsMCPServer.run_sse()` builds a Starlette MCP HTTP+SSE server around `mcp.server.sse.SseServerTransport`. The server exposes `/sse` and…

# PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal ## Summary PraisonAI's Dynamic Context module provides filesystem-backed history and terminal-log storage. The SDK reference describes the module as providing: -…

# DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals ## Summary `praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval` approves a pending dangerous tool call when it sees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is classified as approval,…

## Summary The `execute_code` tool's subprocess sandbox advertises a three-layer defense (AST validation, text-pattern blocklist, restricted `__builtins__`). In **sandbox mode** (the default) only two layers are active — the text-pattern blocklist is skipped — and both…

# SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass ## Summary `SpiderTools.scrape_page()` validates the initial URL and rejects direct loopback, private, link-local, metadata, and internal hostnames. It then calls `requests.Session.get()` without disabling automatic…