COROS

An issue was discovered in the COROS application through 3.8.12 for Android. Bluetooth pairing and bonding is neither initiated nor enforced by the application itself. Also, the watch does not enforce pairing and bonding. As a result, any data transmitted via BLE remains unencrypted, allowing attackers within Bluetooth range to eavesdrop on the communication. Furthermore, even if a user manually initiates pairing and bonding in the Android settings, the application continues to transmit data without requiring the watch to be bonded. This fallback behavior enables attackers to exploit the communication, for example, by conducting an active machine-in-the-middle attack.

An issue was discovered on COROS PACE 3 devices through 3.0808.0. It implements a function to connect the watch to a WLAN. With WLAN access, the COROS Pace 3 downloads firmware files via HTTP. However, the communication is not encrypted and allows sniffing and machine-in-the-middle attacks.

An issue was discovered in COROS PACE 3 through 3.0808.0. Due to an out-of-bounds read vulnerability, sending a crafted BLE message forces the device to reboot.

An issue was discovered on COROS PACE 3 devices through 3.0808.0. The BLE implementation of the COROS smartwatch does not support LE Secure Connections and instead enforces BLE Legacy Pairing. In BLE Legacy Pairing, the Short-Term Key (STK) can be easily guessed. This requires knowledge of the Temporary Key (TK), which, in the case of the COROS Pace 3, is set to 0 due to the Just Works pairing method. An attacker within Bluetooth range can therefore perform sniffing attacks, allowing eavesdropping on the communication.

An issue was discovered in COROS PACE 3 through 3.0808.0. Due to a NULL pointer dereference vulnerability, sending a crafted BLE message forces the device to reboot.

An issue was discovered on COROS PACE 3 devices through 3.0808.0. It implements a function to connect the watch to a WLAN. This function is mainly for downloading firmware files. Before downloading firmware files, the watch requests some information about the firmware via HTTPS from the back-end API. However, the X.509 server certificate within the TLS handshake is not validated by the device. This allows an attacker within an active machine-in-the-middle position, using a TLS proxy and a self-signed certificate, to eavesdrop and manipulate the HTTPS communication. This could be abused, for example, for stealing the API access token of the assigned user account.

An issue was discovered on COROS PACE 3 devices through 3.0808.0. It starts advertising if no device is connected via Bluetooth. This allows an attacker to connect with the device via BLE if no other device is connected. While connected, none of the BLE services and characteristics of the device require any authentication or security level. Therefore, any characteristic, depending on their mode of operation (read/write/notify), can be used by the connected attacker. This allows, for example, configuring the device, sending notifications, resetting the device to factory settings, or installing software.

An issue was discovered on COROS PACE 3 devices through 3.0808.0. It identifies itself as a device without input or output capabilities, which results in the use of the Just Works pairing method. This method does not implement any authentication, which therefore allows machine-in-the-middle attacks. Furthermore, this lack of authentication allows attackers to interact with the device via BLE without requiring prior authorization.