Byron

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. This vulnerability leads to a major loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. This vulnerability has been patched in version(s) 0.36.0.

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. `gix-transport` does not check the username part of a URL for text that the external `ssh` program would interpret as an option. A specially crafted clone URL can smuggle options to SSH. The possibilities are syntactically limited, but if a malicious clone URL is used by an application whose current working directory contains a malicious file, arbitrary code execution occurs. This is related to the patched vulnerability GHSA-rrjw-j4m2-mf34, but appears less severe due to a greater attack complexity. This issue has been patched in versions 0.35.0, 0.42.0 and 0.62.0.

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. On Windows, fetching refs that clash with legacy device names reads from the devices, and checking out paths that clash with such names writes arbitrary data to the devices. This allows a repository, when cloned, to cause indefinite blocking or the production of arbitrary message that appear to have come from the application, and potentially other harmful effects under limited circumstances. If Windows is not used, or untrusted repositories are not cloned or otherwise used, then there is no impact. A minor degradation in availability may also be possible, such as with a very large file named `CON`, though the user could interrupt the application.

gitoxide An idiomatic, lean, fast & safe pure Rust implementation of Git. gitoxide-core, which provides most underlying functionality of the gix and ein commands, does not neutralize newlines, backspaces, or control characters—including those that form ANSI escape sequences—that appear in a repository's paths, author and committer names, commit messages, or other metadata. Such text may be written as part of the output of a command, as well as appearing in error messages when an operation fails. This sometimes allows an untrusted repository to misrepresent its contents and to alter or concoct error messages.

gix-path is a crate of the gitoxide project dealing with git paths and their conversions. `gix-path` executes `git` to find the path of a configuration file that belongs to the `git` installation itself, but mistakenly treats the local repository's configuration as system-wide if no higher scoped configuration is found. In rare cases, this causes a less trusted repository to be treated as more trusted, or leaks sensitive information from one repository to another, such as sending credentials to another repository's remote. In `gix_path::env`, the underlying implementation of the `installation_config` and `installation_config_prefix` functions calls `git config -l --show-origin` and parses the first line of the output to extract the path to the configuration file holding the configuration variable of highest scope. It is believed to be very difficult to exploit this vulnerability deliberately, due to the need either to anticipate a situation in which higher-scoped configuration variables would be absent, or to arrange for this to happen. Although any operating system may be affected, users running Apple Git on macOS are much less likely to be affected. This issue has been addressed in release version 0.10.10. All users are advised to upgrade.