Wi Fi 6 Ax201 Firmware
by Intel
CVEs (47)
| CVE | Vendor / Product | Sev | Risk | CVSS | EPSS | KEV | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-0072 | Med | 0.36 | 5.5 | 0.00 | Feb 9, 2022 | Improper input validation in firmware for some Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless Wi-Fi in multiple operating systems and some Killer(TM) Wi-Fi in Windows 10 and 11 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access. | ||
| CVE-2020-26139 | Med | 0.35 | 5.3 | 0.06 | May 11, 2021 | An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against… | ||
| CVE-2021-0176 | Med | 0.29 | 4.4 | 0.00 | Feb 9, 2022 | Improper input validation in firmware for some Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless Wi-Fi in multiple operating systems and some Killer(TM) Wi-Fi in Windows 10 and 11 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable denial of service via local access. | ||
| CVE-2022-26047 | Med | 0.28 | 4.3 | 0.00 | Nov 11, 2022 | Improper input validation for some Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless WiFi, Intel vPro(R) CSME WiFi and Killer(TM) WiFi products may allow unauthenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via local access. | ||
| CVE-2020-24588 | Low | 0.23 | 3.5 | 0.04 | May 11, 2021 | The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is… | ||
| CVE-2021-23188 | Low | 0.21 | 3.3 | 0.00 | Aug 18, 2022 | Improper access control for some Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless WiFi and Killer(TM) WiFi products may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access. | ||
| CVE-2020-24587 | Low | 0.17 | 2.6 | 0.03 | May 11, 2021 | The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends… |
- risk 0.36cvss 5.5epss 0.00
Improper input validation in firmware for some Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless Wi-Fi in multiple operating systems and some Killer(TM) Wi-Fi in Windows 10 and 11 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access.
- risk 0.35cvss 5.3epss 0.06
An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against…
- risk 0.29cvss 4.4epss 0.00
Improper input validation in firmware for some Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless Wi-Fi in multiple operating systems and some Killer(TM) Wi-Fi in Windows 10 and 11 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable denial of service via local access.
- risk 0.28cvss 4.3epss 0.00
Improper input validation for some Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless WiFi, Intel vPro(R) CSME WiFi and Killer(TM) WiFi products may allow unauthenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via local access.
- risk 0.23cvss 3.5epss 0.04
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is…
- risk 0.21cvss 3.3epss 0.00
Improper access control for some Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless WiFi and Killer(TM) WiFi products may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access.
- risk 0.17cvss 2.6epss 0.03
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends…
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