Hanshow NFC
by Hanshow
CVEs (3)
| CVE | Vendor / Product | Sev | Risk | CVSS | EPSS | KEV | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-130801 | Cri | 0.64 | 9.8 | 0.00 | Nov 17, 2026 | The device's command parser does not require asymmetric cryptographic signatures to validate incoming APDU packets. This enables an attacker to inject forged, unauthorized commands to manipulate device features and configurations once the initial handshake is bypassed. | ||
| CVE-2026-130802 | Cri | 0.59 | 9.1 | 0.00 | Nov 17, 2026 | The NFC authentication handshake relies on a fixed, static challenge instead of a unique, random value for every session. This allows an attacker to perform a "replay attack," successfully authenticating by simply sending the same pre-recorded response. | ||
| CVE-2026-130804 | Med | 0.40 | 6.1 | 0.00 | Nov 17, 2026 | The microcontroller lacks enabled debug lock bits, leaving the physical Single-Wire (SWS) debugging interface completely unrestricted. This allows an attacker with physical access to use a hardware programmer to dump the entire production firmware. |
- risk 0.64cvss 9.8epss 0.00
The device's command parser does not require asymmetric cryptographic signatures to validate incoming APDU packets. This enables an attacker to inject forged, unauthorized commands to manipulate device features and configurations once the initial handshake is bypassed.
- risk 0.59cvss 9.1epss 0.00
The NFC authentication handshake relies on a fixed, static challenge instead of a unique, random value for every session. This allows an attacker to perform a "replay attack," successfully authenticating by simply sending the same pre-recorded response.
- risk 0.40cvss 6.1epss 0.00
The microcontroller lacks enabled debug lock bits, leaving the physical Single-Wire (SWS) debugging interface completely unrestricted. This allows an attacker with physical access to use a hardware programmer to dump the entire production firmware.