OMAP L138
CVEs (3)
| CVE | Vendor / Product | Sev | Risk | CVSS | EPSS | KEV | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-25332 | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | Oct 19, 2023 | The AES implementation in the Texas Instruments OMAP L138 (secure variants), present in mask ROM, suffers from a timing side channel which can be exploited by an adversary with non-secure supervisor privileges by managing cache contents and collecting timing information for… | |||
| CVE-2022-25334 | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | Oct 19, 2023 | The Texas Instruments OMAP L138 (secure variants) trusted execution environment (TEE) lacks a bounds check on the signature size field in the SK_LOAD module loading routine, present in mask ROM. A module with a sufficiently large signature field causes a stack overflow,… | |||
| CVE-2022-25333 | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | Oct 19, 2023 | The Texas Instruments OMAP L138 (secure variants) trusted execution environment (TEE) performs an RSA check implemented in mask ROM when loading a module through the SK_LOAD routine. However, only the module header authenticity is validated. An adversary can re-use any correctly… |
- CVE-2022-25332Oct 19, 2023risk 0.00cvss —epss 0.00
The AES implementation in the Texas Instruments OMAP L138 (secure variants), present in mask ROM, suffers from a timing side channel which can be exploited by an adversary with non-secure supervisor privileges by managing cache contents and collecting timing information for…
- CVE-2022-25334Oct 19, 2023risk 0.00cvss —epss 0.00
The Texas Instruments OMAP L138 (secure variants) trusted execution environment (TEE) lacks a bounds check on the signature size field in the SK_LOAD module loading routine, present in mask ROM. A module with a sufficiently large signature field causes a stack overflow,…
- CVE-2022-25333Oct 19, 2023risk 0.00cvss —epss 0.00
The Texas Instruments OMAP L138 (secure variants) trusted execution environment (TEE) performs an RSA check implemented in mask ROM when loading a module through the SK_LOAD routine. However, only the module header authenticity is validated. An adversary can re-use any correctly…