Bitnami package
gitea
pkg:bitnami/gitea
Vulnerabilities (73)
| CVE | Sev | CVSS | KEV | Affected versions | Fixed in | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-97208 | Med | 4.9 | < 28.1.0 | 28.1.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new pu | |
| CVE-2026-96594 | Med | 6.1 | < 28.1.0 | 28.1.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository | |
| CVE-2026-89182 | Med | 5.4 | >= 1.27.0, < 28.1.0 | 28.1.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in | |
| CVE-2026-86684 | Hig | 7.1 | >= 1.18.0, < 28.1.0 | 28.1.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror t | |
| CVE-2026-105268 | Med | 4.3 | < 28.1.0 | 28.1.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | The Gitea API routes for issue attachments (`/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/assets/{attachment_id}`) also accepted attachments that belong to comments on the issue. Because the author of an issue may edit and delete the issue's attachments, a user who opened an issue | |
| CVE-2026-105267 | Hig | 8.1 | < 28.1.0 | 28.1.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | The Gitea web route for deleting tags (`POST /{owner}/{repo}/tags/delete`) requires only write access to the Code unit, but shares its handler with release deletion and did not check that the target was a plain tag. A collaborator with Code write access and without Releases write | |
| CVE-2026-104633 | Med | 6.5 | < 28.1.0 | 28.1.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | When migrating a repository from another Gitea instance, Gitea used the page size reported in the source server's API settings to end its paginated downloads. A source that reported `max_response_items` as `0` made these loops run indefinitely and grow server memory until it was | |
| CVE-2026-101023 | Cri | 9.1 | < 28.1.0 | 28.1.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | Gitea's OAuth2 token endpoint verified the signature and grant of a token submitted with the `refresh_token` grant type, but not that the token was a refresh token. An unexpired access token for the same OAuth2 application and grant could be exchanged for a new access token and r | |
| CVE-2026-96589 | Med | 4.3 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | When a private repository is transferred to a user who lacks access, Gitea grants that recipient temporary read access as a collaborator so they can review the repository. Rejecting or cancelling the transfer did not revoke this collaboration, so the named recipient kept persiste | |
| CVE-2026-96580 | Hig | 7.5 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | Gitea expanded a workflow's static `strategy.matrix` into its full Cartesian product without a size limit when creating a run, before the fork pull request approval gate applied. A user who can open a pull request from a fork could submit a small workflow file whose matrix expand | |
| CVE-2026-96404 | Hig | 8.1 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | When Gitea's web installer is reachable against a database that already contains users, such as after `INSTALL_LOCK` has been reset to `false`, submitting the install form with an administrator username matching an existing account issued an authenticated session for that account | |
| CVE-2026-96400 | Med | 4.3 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | With `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` set to a matching entry such as `*` or a hostname wildcard, Gitea's migration URL validation could permit reserved and link-local addresses, such as `169.254.169.254`, even when `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`. The local-network block list did no | |
| CVE-2026-96399 | Hig | 7.5 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | A repository's external issue tracker regular expression containing alternating capture groups could produce invalid slice indexes when Gitea rendered issue references, causing a runtime panic that terminated the Gitea process. A user who can edit a repository's external issue tr | |
| CVE-2026-95112 | Med | 6.5 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | When processing issue and comment bodies, Gitea scanned the entire preceding text for action keywords such as "closes" or "fixes" once per Markdown link, giving processing time quadratic in the input size. An authenticated user able to submit issue or comment content could send a | |
| CVE-2026-95106 | Cri | 9.1 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | Gitea accepted pushed Git trees containing two entries with the same name, which Git's own consistency checks reject. Gitea's web views resolved such a path to the first entry, while `git checkout`, Gitea Actions, and release archives use the last. A contributor could open a pull | |
| CVE-2026-94205 | Cri | 9.8 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | Gitea Actions decided whether a fork pull request run needed approval based on the user who triggered the event rather than the pull request author. For `pull_request` activity triggered by a maintainer during ordinary triage, such as adding a label, the run was created without r | |
| CVE-2026-89430 | Hig | 8.1 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | Gitea validated a push mirror's remote address against the `[migrations]` allow and block lists only when the mirror was created. Each synchronization passed the stored address directly to `git push`, so a name that later resolved to a blocked or internal address was still reache | |
| CVE-2026-79960 | Hig | 7.1 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | When a push was authenticated with a deploy key, Gitea recorded the repository owner as the pusher, so permission checks in the push hook pipeline evaluated the owner instead of the deploy key. A holder of a writable deploy key could create protected tags without being on the tag | |
| CVE-2026-73278 | Cri | 9.8 | >= 1.16.0, < 1.27.2 | 1.27.2 | Oct 6, 2026 | Gitea's OAuth2 and OpenID Connect sign-in paths do not require a WebAuthn challenge when WebAuthn is the account's only configured second factor. A party able to authenticate through the affected external identity flow can obtain a full session without the passkey verification en | |
| CVE-2026-70357 | Hig | 7.5 | < 28.0.0 | 28.0.0 | Oct 6, 2026 | Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the addres |
- affected < 28.1.0fixed 28.1.0
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new pu
- affected < 28.1.0fixed 28.1.0
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository
- affected >= 1.27.0, < 28.1.0fixed 28.1.0
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in
- affected >= 1.18.0, < 28.1.0fixed 28.1.0
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror t
- affected < 28.1.0fixed 28.1.0
The Gitea API routes for issue attachments (`/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/assets/{attachment_id}`) also accepted attachments that belong to comments on the issue. Because the author of an issue may edit and delete the issue's attachments, a user who opened an issue
- affected < 28.1.0fixed 28.1.0
The Gitea web route for deleting tags (`POST /{owner}/{repo}/tags/delete`) requires only write access to the Code unit, but shares its handler with release deletion and did not check that the target was a plain tag. A collaborator with Code write access and without Releases write
- affected < 28.1.0fixed 28.1.0
When migrating a repository from another Gitea instance, Gitea used the page size reported in the source server's API settings to end its paginated downloads. A source that reported `max_response_items` as `0` made these loops run indefinitely and grow server memory until it was
- affected < 28.1.0fixed 28.1.0
Gitea's OAuth2 token endpoint verified the signature and grant of a token submitted with the `refresh_token` grant type, but not that the token was a refresh token. An unexpired access token for the same OAuth2 application and grant could be exchanged for a new access token and r
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
When a private repository is transferred to a user who lacks access, Gitea grants that recipient temporary read access as a collaborator so they can review the repository. Rejecting or cancelling the transfer did not revoke this collaboration, so the named recipient kept persiste
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
Gitea expanded a workflow's static `strategy.matrix` into its full Cartesian product without a size limit when creating a run, before the fork pull request approval gate applied. A user who can open a pull request from a fork could submit a small workflow file whose matrix expand
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
When Gitea's web installer is reachable against a database that already contains users, such as after `INSTALL_LOCK` has been reset to `false`, submitting the install form with an administrator username matching an existing account issued an authenticated session for that account
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
With `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` set to a matching entry such as `*` or a hostname wildcard, Gitea's migration URL validation could permit reserved and link-local addresses, such as `169.254.169.254`, even when `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`. The local-network block list did no
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
A repository's external issue tracker regular expression containing alternating capture groups could produce invalid slice indexes when Gitea rendered issue references, causing a runtime panic that terminated the Gitea process. A user who can edit a repository's external issue tr
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
When processing issue and comment bodies, Gitea scanned the entire preceding text for action keywords such as "closes" or "fixes" once per Markdown link, giving processing time quadratic in the input size. An authenticated user able to submit issue or comment content could send a
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
Gitea accepted pushed Git trees containing two entries with the same name, which Git's own consistency checks reject. Gitea's web views resolved such a path to the first entry, while `git checkout`, Gitea Actions, and release archives use the last. A contributor could open a pull
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
Gitea Actions decided whether a fork pull request run needed approval based on the user who triggered the event rather than the pull request author. For `pull_request` activity triggered by a maintainer during ordinary triage, such as adding a label, the run was created without r
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
Gitea validated a push mirror's remote address against the `[migrations]` allow and block lists only when the mirror was created. Each synchronization passed the stored address directly to `git push`, so a name that later resolved to a blocked or internal address was still reache
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
When a push was authenticated with a deploy key, Gitea recorded the repository owner as the pusher, so permission checks in the push hook pipeline evaluated the owner instead of the deploy key. A holder of a writable deploy key could create protected tags without being on the tag
- affected >= 1.16.0, < 1.27.2fixed 1.27.2
Gitea's OAuth2 and OpenID Connect sign-in paths do not require a WebAuthn challenge when WebAuthn is the account's only configured second factor. A party able to authenticate through the affected external identity flow can obtain a full session without the passkey verification en
- affected < 28.0.0fixed 28.0.0
Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the addres
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