VYPR

CWE-416

Use After Free

VariantStableLikelihood: High

Description

The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer.

Hierarchy (View 1000)

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CVEs mapped to this weakness (1,404)

page 33 of 71
CVESevRiskCVSSEPSSKEVPublishedDescription
CVE-2026-23336Hig0.517.80.00Mar 25, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: cancel rfkill_block work in wiphy_unregister() There is a use-after-free error in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces found by syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112a78d98 by task kworker/0:5/5326 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5326 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cfg80211_rfkill_block_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 print_report+0xcd/0x630 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220 cfg80211_rfkill_block_work+0x1e/0x30 process_one_work+0x9cf/0x1b70 worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kthread+0x3c5/0x780 ret_from_fork+0x56d/0x700 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> The problem arises due to the rfkill_block work is not cancelled when wiphy is being unregistered. In order to fix the issue cancel the corresponding work in wiphy_unregister(). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
CVE-2026-23322Hig0.517.80.00Mar 25, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: Fix use-after-free and list corruption on sender error The analysis from Breno: When the SMI sender returns an error, smi_work() delivers an error response but then jumps back to restart without cleaning up properly: 1. intf->curr_msg is not cleared, so no new message is pulled 2. newmsg still points to the message, causing sender() to be called again with the same message 3. If sender() fails again, deliver_err_response() is called with the same recv_msg that was already queued for delivery This causes list_add corruption ("list_add double add") because the recv_msg is added to the user_msgs list twice. Subsequently, the corrupted list leads to use-after-free when the memory is freed and reused, and eventually a NULL pointer dereference when accessing recv_msg->done. The buggy sequence: sender() fails -> deliver_err_response(recv_msg) // recv_msg queued for delivery -> goto restart // curr_msg not cleared! sender() fails again (same message!) -> deliver_err_response(recv_msg) // tries to queue same recv_msg -> LIST CORRUPTION Fix this by freeing the message and setting it to NULL on a send error. Also, always free the newmsg on a send error, otherwise it will leak.
CVE-2026-23319Hig0.517.80.00Mar 25, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim The root cause of this bug is that when 'bpf_link_put' reduces the refcount of 'shim_link->link.link' to zero, the resource is considered released but may still be referenced via 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'cgroup_shim_find'. The actual cleanup of 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' is deferred. During this window, another process can cause a use-after-free via 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'. Based on Martin KaFai Lau's suggestions, I have created a simple patch. To fix this: Add an atomic non-zero check in 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'. Only increment the refcount if it is not already zero. Testing: I verified the fix by adding a delay in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' to make the bug easier to trigger: static void bpf_shim_tramp_link_release(struct bpf_link *link) { /* ... */ if (!shim_link->trampoline) return; + msleep(100); WARN_ON_ONCE(bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(&shim_link->link, shim_link->trampoline, NULL)); bpf_trampoline_put(shim_link->trampoline); } Before the patch, running a PoC easily reproduced the crash(almost 100%) with a call trace similar to KaiyanM's report. After the patch, the bug no longer occurs even after millions of iterations.
CVE-2026-23227Hig0.517.80.00Feb 18, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx->lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free Exynos Virtual Display driver performs memory alloc/free operations without lock protection, which easily causes concurrency problem. For example, use-after-free can occur in race scenario like this: ``` CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 ---- ---- ---- vidi_connection_ioctl() if (vidi->connection) // true drm_edid = drm_edid_alloc(); // alloc drm_edid ... ctx->raw_edid = drm_edid; ... drm_mode_getconnector() drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes() vidi_get_modes() if (ctx->raw_edid) // true drm_edid_dup(ctx->raw_edid); if (!drm_edid) // false ... vidi_connection_ioctl() if (vidi->connection) // false drm_edid_free(ctx->raw_edid); // free drm_edid ... drm_edid_alloc(drm_edid->edid) kmemdup(edid); // UAF!! ... ``` To prevent these vulns, at least in vidi_context, member variables related to memory alloc/free should be protected with ctx->lock.
CVE-2026-23224Hig0.517.80.00Feb 18, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: fix UAF issue for file-backed mounts w/ directio option [ 9.269940][ T3222] Call trace: [ 9.269948][ T3222] ext4_file_read_iter+0xac/0x108 [ 9.269979][ T3222] vfs_iocb_iter_read+0xac/0x198 [ 9.269993][ T3222] erofs_fileio_rq_submit+0x12c/0x180 [ 9.270008][ T3222] erofs_fileio_submit_bio+0x14/0x24 [ 9.270030][ T3222] z_erofs_runqueue+0x834/0x8ac [ 9.270054][ T3222] z_erofs_read_folio+0x120/0x220 [ 9.270083][ T3222] filemap_read_folio+0x60/0x120 [ 9.270102][ T3222] filemap_fault+0xcac/0x1060 [ 9.270119][ T3222] do_pte_missing+0x2d8/0x1554 [ 9.270131][ T3222] handle_mm_fault+0x5ec/0x70c [ 9.270142][ T3222] do_page_fault+0x178/0x88c [ 9.270167][ T3222] do_translation_fault+0x38/0x54 [ 9.270183][ T3222] do_mem_abort+0x54/0xac [ 9.270208][ T3222] el0_da+0x44/0x7c [ 9.270227][ T3222] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x5c/0xf4 [ 9.270253][ T3222] el0t_64_sync+0x1bc/0x1c0 EROFS may encounter above panic when enabling file-backed mount w/ directio mount option, the root cause is it may suffer UAF in below race condition: - z_erofs_read_folio wq s_dio_done_wq - z_erofs_runqueue - erofs_fileio_submit_bio - erofs_fileio_rq_submit - vfs_iocb_iter_read - ext4_file_read_iter - ext4_dio_read_iter - iomap_dio_rw : bio was submitted and return -EIOCBQUEUED - dio_aio_complete_work - dio_complete - dio->iocb->ki_complete (erofs_fileio_ki_complete()) - kfree(rq) : it frees iocb, iocb.ki_filp can be UAF in file_accessed(). - file_accessed : access NULL file point Introduce a reference count in struct erofs_fileio_rq, and initialize it as two, both erofs_fileio_ki_complete() and erofs_fileio_rq_submit() will decrease reference count, the last one decreasing the reference count to zero will free rq.
CVE-2026-23209Hig0.517.80.00Feb 14, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: <quote valis> The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, &params, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). </quote valis> With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
CVE-2026-23192Hig0.517.80.00Feb 14, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: linkwatch: use __dev_put() in callers to prevent UAF After linkwatch_do_dev() calls __dev_put() to release the linkwatch reference, the device refcount may drop to 1. At this point, netdev_run_todo() can proceed (since linkwatch_sync_dev() sees an empty list and returns without blocking), wait for the refcount to become 1 via netdev_wait_allrefs_any(), and then free the device via kobject_put(). This creates a use-after-free when __linkwatch_run_queue() tries to call netdev_unlock_ops() on the already-freed device. Note that adding netdev_lock_ops()/netdev_unlock_ops() pair in netdev_run_todo() before kobject_put() would not work, because netdev_lock_ops() is conditional - it only locks when netdev_need_ops_lock() returns true. If the device doesn't require ops_lock, linkwatch won't hold any lock, and netdev_run_todo() acquiring the lock won't provide synchronization. Fix this by moving __dev_put() from linkwatch_do_dev() to its callers. The device reference logically pairs with de-listing the device, so it's reasonable for the caller that did the de-listing to release it. This allows placing __dev_put() after all device accesses are complete, preventing UAF. The bug can be reproduced by adding mdelay(2000) after linkwatch_do_dev() in __linkwatch_run_queue(), then running: ip tuntap add mode tun name tun_test ip link set tun_test up ip link set tun_test carrier off ip link set tun_test carrier on sleep 0.5 ip tuntap del mode tun name tun_test KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in netdev_need_ops_lock include/net/netdev_lock.h:33 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in netdev_unlock_ops include/net/netdev_lock.h:47 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __linkwatch_run_queue+0x865/0x8a0 net/core/link_watch.c:245 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804de5c008 by task kworker/u32:10/8123 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8123 Comm: kworker/u32:10 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound linkwatch_event Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x156/0x4c9 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0 mm/kasan/report.c:595 netdev_need_ops_lock include/net/netdev_lock.h:33 [inline] netdev_unlock_ops include/net/netdev_lock.h:47 [inline] __linkwatch_run_queue+0x865/0x8a0 net/core/link_watch.c:245 linkwatch_event+0x8f/0xc0 net/core/link_watch.c:304 process_one_work+0x9c2/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3257 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3340 [inline] worker_thread+0x5da/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x3b3/0x730 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x754/0xaf0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 </TASK> ==================================================================
CVE-2026-23191Hig0.517.80.00Feb 14, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: aloop: Fix racy access at PCM trigger The PCM trigger callback of aloop driver tries to check the PCM state and stop the stream of the tied substream in the corresponding cable. Since both check and stop operations are performed outside the cable lock, this may result in UAF when a program attempts to trigger frequently while opening/closing the tied stream, as spotted by fuzzers. For addressing the UAF, this patch changes two things: - It covers the most of code in loopback_check_format() with cable->lock spinlock, and add the proper NULL checks. This avoids already some racy accesses. - In addition, now we try to check the state of the capture PCM stream that may be stopped in this function, which was the major pain point leading to UAF.
CVE-2026-23185Hig0.517.80.00Feb 14, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: mld: cancel mlo_scan_start_wk mlo_scan_start_wk is not canceled on disconnection. In fact, it is not canceled anywhere except in the restart cleanup, where we don't really have to. This can cause an init-after-queue issue: if, for example, the work was queued and then drv_change_interface got executed. This can also cause use-after-free: if the work is executed after the vif is freed.
CVE-2026-23184Hig0.517.80.00Feb 14, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix UAF in binder_netlink_report() Oneway transactions sent to frozen targets via binder_proc_transaction() return a BR_TRANSACTION_PENDING_FROZEN error but they are still treated as successful since the target is expected to thaw at some point. It is then not safe to access 't' after BR_TRANSACTION_PENDING_FROZEN errors as the transaction could have been consumed by the now thawed target. This is the case for binder_netlink_report() which derreferences 't' after a pending frozen error, as pointed out by the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_netlink_report.isra.0+0x694/0x6c8 Read of size 8 at addr ffff00000f98ba38 by task binder-util/522 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 522 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.19.0-rc6-00015-gc03e9c42ae8f #1 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: binder_netlink_report.isra.0+0x694/0x6c8 binder_transaction+0x66e4/0x79b8 binder_thread_write+0xab4/0x4440 binder_ioctl+0x1fd4/0x2940 [...] Allocated by task 522: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x17c/0x50c binder_transaction+0x584/0x79b8 binder_thread_write+0xab4/0x4440 binder_ioctl+0x1fd4/0x2940 [...] Freed by task 488: kfree+0x1d0/0x420 binder_free_transaction+0x150/0x234 binder_thread_read+0x2d08/0x3ce4 binder_ioctl+0x488/0x2940 [...] ================================================================== Instead, make a transaction copy so the data can be safely accessed by binder_netlink_report() after a pending frozen error. While here, add a comment about not using t->buffer in binder_netlink_report().
CVE-2026-23171Hig0.517.80.00Feb 14, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bonding: fix use-after-free due to enslave fail after slave array update Fix a use-after-free which happens due to enslave failure after the new slave has been added to the array. Since the new slave can be used for Tx immediately, we can use it after it has been freed by the enslave error cleanup path which frees the allocated slave memory. Slave update array is supposed to be called last when further enslave failures are not expected. Move it after xdp setup to avoid any problems. It is very easy to reproduce the problem with a simple xdp_pass prog: ip l add bond1 type bond mode balance-xor ip l set bond1 up ip l set dev bond1 xdp object xdp_pass.o sec xdp_pass ip l add dumdum type dummy Then run in parallel: while :; do ip l set dumdum master bond1 1>/dev/null 2>&1; done; mausezahn bond1 -a own -b rand -A rand -B 1.1.1.1 -c 0 -t tcp "dp=1-1023, flags=syn" The crash happens almost immediately: [ 605.602850] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0e6fc2460000137: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 605.602916] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x07380123000009b8-0x07380123000009bf] [ 605.602946] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2445 Comm: mausezahn Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.19.0-rc6+ #21 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 605.602979] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE [ 605.602998] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 605.603032] RIP: 0010:netdev_core_pick_tx+0xcd/0x210 [ 605.603063] Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 3e 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 6b 08 49 8d 7d 30 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 25 01 00 00 49 8b 45 30 4c 89 e2 48 89 ee 48 89 [ 605.603111] RSP: 0018:ffff88817b9af348 EFLAGS: 00010213 [ 605.603145] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88817d28b420 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 605.603172] RDX: 00e7002460000137 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 07380123000009be [ 605.603199] RBP: ffff88817b541a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff3ed8c0c [ 605.603226] R10: ffffffff9f6c6067 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 605.603253] R13: 073801230000098e R14: ffff88817d28b448 R15: ffff88817b541a84 [ 605.603286] FS: 00007f6570ef67c0(0000) GS:ffff888221dfa000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 605.603319] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 605.603343] CR2: 00007f65712fae40 CR3: 000000011371b000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ 605.603373] Call Trace: [ 605.603392] <TASK> [ 605.603410] __dev_queue_xmit+0x448/0x32a0 [ 605.603434] ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10 [ 605.603461] ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10 [ 605.603484] ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10 [ 605.603507] ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding] [ 605.603546] ? _printk+0xcb/0x100 [ 605.603566] ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10 [ 605.603589] ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding] [ 605.603627] ? add_taint+0x5e/0x70 [ 605.603648] ? add_taint+0x2a/0x70 [ 605.603670] ? end_report.cold+0x51/0x75 [ 605.603693] ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding] [ 605.603731] bond_start_xmit+0x623/0xc20 [bonding]
CVE-2026-23111Hig0.517.80.00Feb 13, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate() nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and compared to what is logically required. nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction. It should skip elements that are already active (they don't need re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive elements and processes active ones. Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct: nft_mapelem_activate(): if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter->genmask)) return 0; /* skip active, process inactive */ With the buggy catchall version: nft_map_catchall_activate(): if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask)) continue; /* skip inactive, process active */ The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted, nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element. For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never called to restore the chain->use reference count. Each abort cycle permanently decrements chain->use. Once chain->use reaches zero, DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free. This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES. Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate(): skip active elements, process inactive ones.
CVE-2026-23077Hig0.517.80.00Feb 4, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted merge Patch series "mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted merge", v2. Commit 879bca0a2c4f ("mm/vma: fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA merges") introduced the ability to merge previously unavailable VMA merge scenarios. However, it is handling merges incorrectly when it comes to mremap() of a faulted VMA adjacent to an unfaulted VMA. The issues arise in three cases: 1. Previous VMA unfaulted: copied -----| v |-----------|.............| | unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| |-----------|.............| prev 2. Next VMA unfaulted: copied -----| v |.............|-----------| |(faulted VMA)| unfaulted | |.............|-----------| next 3. Both adjacent VMAs unfaulted: copied -----| v |-----------|.............|-----------| | unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| unfaulted | |-----------|.............|-----------| prev next This series fixes each of these cases, and introduces self tests to assert that the issues are corrected. I also test a further case which was already handled, to assert that my changes continues to correctly handle it: 4. prev unfaulted, next faulted: copied -----| v |-----------|.............|-----------| | unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| faulted | |-----------|.............|-----------| prev next This bug was discovered via a syzbot report, linked to in the first patch in the series, I confirmed that this series fixes the bug. I also discovered that we are failing to check that the faulted VMA was not forked when merging a copied VMA in cases 1-3 above, an issue this series also addresses. I also added self tests to assert that this is resolved (and confirmed that the tests failed prior to this). I also cleaned up vma_expand() as part of this work, renamed vma_had_uncowed_parents() to vma_is_fork_child() as the previous name was unduly confusing, and simplified the comments around this function. This patch (of 4): Commit 879bca0a2c4f ("mm/vma: fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA merges") introduced the ability to merge previously unavailable VMA merge scenarios. The key piece of logic introduced was the ability to merge a faulted VMA immediately next to an unfaulted VMA, which relies upon dup_anon_vma() to correctly handle anon_vma state. In the case of the merge of an existing VMA (that is changing properties of a VMA and then merging if those properties are shared by adjacent VMAs), dup_anon_vma() is invoked correctly. However in the case of the merge of a new VMA, a corner case peculiar to mremap() was missed. The issue is that vma_expand() only performs dup_anon_vma() if the target (the VMA that will ultimately become the merged VMA): is not the next VMA, i.e. the one that appears after the range in which the new VMA is to be established. A key insight here is that in all other cases other than mremap(), a new VMA merge either expands an existing VMA, meaning that the target VMA will be that VMA, or would have anon_vma be NULL. Specifically: * __mmap_region() - no anon_vma in place, initial mapping. * do_brk_flags() - expanding an existing VMA. * vma_merge_extend() - expanding an existing VMA. * relocate_vma_down() - no anon_vma in place, initial mapping. In addition, we are in the unique situation of needing to duplicate anon_vma state from a VMA that is neither the previous or next VMA being merged with. dup_anon_vma() deals exclusively with the target=unfaulted, src=faulted case. This leaves four possibilities, in each case where the copied VMA is faulted: 1. Previous VMA unfaulted: copied -----| ---truncated---
CVE-2026-23074Hig0.517.80.00Feb 4, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: Enforce that teql can only be used as root qdisc Design intent of teql is that it is only supposed to be used as root qdisc. We need to check for that constraint. Although not important, I will describe the scenario that unearthed this issue for the curious. GangMin Kim <km.kim1503@gmail.com> managed to concot a scenario as follows: ROOT qdisc 1:0 (QFQ) ├── class 1:1 (weight=15, lmax=16384) netem with delay 6.4s └── class 1:2 (weight=1, lmax=1514) teql GangMin sends a packet which is enqueued to 1:1 (netem). Any invocation of dequeue by QFQ from this class will not return a packet until after 6.4s. In the meantime, a second packet is sent and it lands on 1:2. teql's enqueue will return success and this will activate class 1:2. Main issue is that teql only updates the parent visible qlen (sch->q.qlen) at dequeue. Since QFQ will only call dequeue if peek succeeds (and teql's peek always returns NULL), dequeue will never be called and thus the qlen will remain as 0. With that in mind, when GangMin updates 1:2's lmax value, the qfq_change_class calls qfq_deact_rm_from_agg. Since the child qdisc's qlen was not incremented, qfq fails to deactivate the class, but still frees its pointers from the aggregate. So when the first packet is rescheduled after 6.4 seconds (netem's delay), a dangling pointer is accessed causing GangMin's causing a UAF.
CVE-2025-33220Hig0.517.80.00Jan 28, 2026NVIDIA vGPU software contains a vulnerability in the Virtual GPU Manager, where a malicious guest could cause heap memory access after the memory is freed. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, denial of service, or information disclosure.
CVE-2025-33217Hig0.517.80.00Jan 28, 2026NVIDIA Display Driver for Windows contains a vulnerability where an attacker could trigger a use after free. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, denial of service, and information disclosure.
CVE-2026-23010Hig0.517.80.00Jan 25, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: Fix use-after-free in inet6_addr_del(). syzbot reported use-after-free of inet6_ifaddr in inet6_addr_del(). [0] The cited commit accidentally moved ipv6_del_addr() for mngtmpaddr before reading its ifp->flags for temporary addresses in inet6_addr_del(). Let's move ipv6_del_addr() down to fix the UAF. [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in inet6_addr_del.constprop.0+0x67a/0x6b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3117 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88807b89c86c by task syz.3.1618/9593 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9593 Comm: syz.3.1618 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xcd/0x630 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:595 inet6_addr_del.constprop.0+0x67a/0x6b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3117 addrconf_del_ifaddr+0x11e/0x190 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3181 inet6_ioctl+0x1e5/0x2b0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:582 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1254 sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1375 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f164cf8f749 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f164de64038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f164d1e5fa0 RCX: 00007f164cf8f749 RDX: 0000200000000000 RSI: 0000000000008936 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f164d013f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f164d1e6038 R14: 00007f164d1e5fa0 R15: 00007ffde15c8288 </TASK> Allocated by task 9593: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:397 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:414 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:957 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline] ipv6_add_addr+0x4e3/0x2010 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:1120 inet6_addr_add+0x256/0x9b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3050 addrconf_add_ifaddr+0x1fc/0x450 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3160 inet6_ioctl+0x103/0x2b0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:580 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1254 sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1375 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 6099: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:252 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:284 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:234 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2540 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:2569 [inline] slab_free_bulk mm/slub.c:6696 [inline] kmem_cache_free_bulk mm/slub.c:7383 [inline] kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x2bf/0x680 mm/slub.c:7362 kfree_bulk include/linux/slab.h:830 [inline] kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x1b7/0x1e0 mm/slab_common.c:1523 kvfree_rcu_drain_ready mm/slab_common.c:1728 [inline] kfree_rcu_monitor+0x1d0/0x2f0 mm/slab_common.c:1801 process_one_work+0x9ba/0x1b20 kernel/workqueue.c:3257 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqu ---truncated---
CVE-2026-23001Hig0.517.80.00Jan 25, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix possible UAF in macvlan_forward_source() Add RCU protection on (struct macvlan_source_entry)->vlan. Whenever macvlan_hash_del_source() is called, we must clear entry->vlan pointer before RCU grace period starts. This allows macvlan_forward_source() to skip over entries queued for freeing. Note that macvlan_dev are already RCU protected, as they are embedded in a standard netdev (netdev_priv(ndev)). https: //lore.kernel.org/netdev/695fb1e8.050a0220.1c677c.039f.GAE@google.com/T/#u
CVE-2026-22980Hig0.517.80.00Jan 23, 2026In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: provide locking for v4_end_grace Writing to v4_end_grace can race with server shutdown and result in memory being accessed after it was freed - reclaim_str_hashtbl in particularly. We cannot hold nfsd_mutex across the nfsd4_end_grace() call as that is held while client_tracking_op->init() is called and that can wait for an upcall to nfsdcltrack which can write to v4_end_grace, resulting in a deadlock. nfsd4_end_grace() is also called by the landromat work queue and this doesn't require locking as server shutdown will stop the work and wait for it before freeing anything that nfsd4_end_grace() might access. However, we must be sure that writing to v4_end_grace doesn't restart the work item after shutdown has already waited for it. For this we add a new flag protected with nn->client_lock. It is set only while it is safe to make client tracking calls, and v4_end_grace only schedules work while the flag is set with the spinlock held. So this patch adds a nfsd_net field "client_tracking_active" which is set as described. Another field "grace_end_forced", is set when v4_end_grace is written. After this is set, and providing client_tracking_active is set, the laundromat is scheduled. This "grace_end_forced" field bypasses other checks for whether the grace period has finished. This resolves a race which can result in use-after-free.
CVE-2025-15062Hig0.517.80.00Jan 23, 2026Trimble SketchUp SKP File Parsing Use-After-Free Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Trimble SketchUp. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within the parsing of SKP files. The issue results from the lack of validating the existence of an object prior to performing operations on the object. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-27769.