OpenPLC

OpenPLC_V3 REST API endpoint checks for JWT presence but never verifies the caller's role. Any authenticated user with role=user can delete any other user, including administrators, by specifying their user ID or they can create new accounts with role=admin, escalating to full administrator access.

OpenPLC v3 contains an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability that allows attackers with valid credentials to inject malicious code through the hardware configuration interface. Attackers can upload a custom hardware layer with embedded reverse shell code that establishes a network connection to a specified IP and port, enabling remote command execution.

OpenPLC_V3 is vulnerable to a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack due to the absence of proper CSRF validation. This issue allows an unauthenticated attacker to trick a logged-in administrator into visiting a maliciously crafted link, potentially enabling unauthorized modification of PLC settings or the upload of malicious programs which could lead to significant disruption or damage to connected systems.

OpenPLC_V3 is vulnerable to a Plaintext Storage of a Password vulnerability that could allow an attacker to retrieve credentials and access sensitive information.

A path injection vulnerability exists in OpenPLC v3 (2c82b0e79c53f8c1f1458eee15fec173400d6e1a) as the binary program compiled from glue_generator.cpp does not perform any validation on the file path parameters passed via the command line. The user-controlled input parameters are directly passed to the underlying file operation functions (fopen/ifstream/ofstream) for file reading and writing. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by constructing a malicious path to read arbitrary readable files.