Operation ShadowCloud: New Backdoors GitDoor and GraphDoor Use GitHub, SharePoint for C2
Kaspersky has uncovered Operation ShadowCloud, a cyber intrusion campaign targeting government entities in Asia and Africa, employing novel backdoors that leverage legitimate cloud services for covert command and control.

Government sectors in Asia and Africa have become the target of a sophisticated cyber intrusion campaign, codenamed Operation ShadowCloud by Kaspersky. The campaign, identified by the cybersecurity firm in early 2026, utilizes two previously undocumented backdoors, dubbed GitDoor and GraphDoor. These backdoors are designed to maintain covert command-and-control (C2) communication channels by masquerading their activities within legitimate cloud services, specifically Microsoft SharePoint and GitHub.
The use of these widely adopted platforms for C2 communication presents a significant challenge for detection and defense. Attackers can blend malicious network traffic with legitimate data flows, making it difficult for security solutions to distinguish between normal operations and malicious activity. This technique allows threat actors to remotely issue commands, exfiltrate data, and maintain persistence within compromised networks without raising immediate suspicion.
GitDoor, as its name suggests, leverages GitHub for its C2 operations. This could involve using features like commit messages, issue trackers, or repository data to transmit commands and receive stolen information. Similarly, GraphDoor utilizes Microsoft SharePoint, a platform commonly used for document management and collaboration, to hide its C2 traffic. The specific methods employed within these services are still under investigation, but the principle remains the same: to exploit trusted infrastructure for malicious purposes.
Kaspersky's analysis indicates that the primary targets of Operation ShadowCloud are government entities. This focus suggests that the threat actors behind this campaign are likely state-sponsored or highly motivated groups seeking to gain intelligence, disrupt operations, or exfiltrate sensitive government data. The geographical scope, encompassing both Asia and Africa, points to a broad and potentially impactful campaign.
The discovery of GitDoor and GraphDoor highlights a growing trend in cyber warfare and espionage, where attackers are increasingly sophisticated in their methods of evading detection. By relying on legitimate cloud services, threat actors can bypass traditional perimeter defenses and network monitoring tools that may not be equipped to scrutinize the content of traffic within these trusted environments.
While specific details on the initial infection vectors for Operation ShadowCloud are not yet fully disclosed, such campaigns often rely on phishing, exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities, or supply chain compromises to gain an initial foothold. Once inside, the GitDoor and GraphDoor backdoors can then be deployed to establish persistent and covert communication channels.
Security researchers are urging organizations, particularly those in the government sector within the affected regions, to enhance their network monitoring capabilities. This includes scrutinizing traffic to and from cloud services like GitHub and SharePoint for any anomalous patterns or suspicious data exchanges. Proactive threat hunting and the implementation of advanced security solutions capable of deep packet inspection and behavioral analysis are crucial for detecting and mitigating such stealthy threats.
The ongoing investigation into Operation ShadowCloud aims to uncover the full extent of the campaign, identify the threat actors involved, and develop more robust defenses against these novel C2 techniques. The findings underscore the ever-evolving landscape of cyber threats and the critical need for continuous adaptation in cybersecurity strategies.
This second part of the Operation ShadowCloud analysis delves into the GraphDoor backdoor's technical mechanisms, detailing its use of vectored exception handlers for covert API calls and its authentication process with Microsoft's Graph API. It further elaborates on the specific plugins deployed, including patched Erfrp and Ably proxy plugins, and provides additional attribution clues linking the operation to Chinese-speaking threat actors.
This new report from Securelist provides a deeper technical dive into Operation ShadowCloud, detailing the initial infection vector which leverages a modified MeshAgent utility. It further elaborates on the specific techniques used for DLL sideloading with legitimate binaries and the multi-stage decryption process employed by the malicious loaders, including RC4 and XOR obfuscation, before injecting the final backdoor payload into memory.