NULLZEREPTOOL Framework Leverages Telegram for DDoS Attacks, Hints at Wireless Capabilities
A new attack framework dubbed NULLZEREPTOOL uses Telegram bots to orchestrate sophisticated DDoS campaigns, incorporating rotating proxies and experimental wireless disruption modules.

A newly identified attack framework, named NULLZEREPTOOL, has emerged, transforming a Telegram bot into a remote control panel for potent distributed denial of service (DDoS) campaigns. This framework was brought to light through a Pastebin post that exposed the complete Python source code for a Telegram-managed DDoS and attack bot. While initially appearing as a rudimentary script, deeper analysis revealed a more complex design that combines a proven DDoS engine with experimental modules for wireless disruption and credential handling.
Researchers from Flare, who analyzed the framework, noted that later variants of NULLZEREPTOOL expand beyond simple flooding. These versions hint at capabilities for WiFi deauthentication and Bluetooth jamming, though these features are dependent on missing client components and external tools, suggesting they are still in a testing phase. At its core, NULLZEREPTOOL functions as a Telegram-controlled DDoS panel, rather than a traditional self-spreading botnet. It supports twenty distinct attack methods, automatically scales worker threads, and utilizes rotating proxies to maintain pressure against hardened web applications, mirroring tactics seen in recent Telegram-coordinated DDoS campaigns.
The DDoS engine is powered by a METHODS dictionary that maps twenty attack names to specific worker functions. Each function operates in its own thread, executing distinct flooding routines such as HTTP GET requests, UDP packets, or a mixed "combo" pattern. The combo_worker is particularly aggressive, bundling multiple HTTP requests, a UDP datagram, and a TCP handshake within a single pass, while dynamically calculating per-worker delays to achieve a configured requests-per-second target.
To sustain these high-volume floods, NULLZEREPTOOL implements a multi-stage proxy pipeline. This pipeline harvests free HTTP proxies from seven different sources, including public lists and GitHub repositories. Each harvested proxy is rigorously tested against httpbin[.]org/ip with strict timeouts. Only fast and responsive proxies are saved to a local file and maintained in an in-memory pool for active attacks. The framework includes a /proxy command within Telegram that triggers a full refresh and validation cycle, allowing operators to easily rebuild their proxy fleet.
NULLZEREPTOOL integrates with Telegram through a hardcoded BOT_TOKEN and an ADMIN_ID check, which restricts access to commands like /attacks, /proxy, /key, and /cvv behind a /login sequence. Once authenticated, the administrator can initiate floods, adjust worker counts, and receive real-time status updates directly within the chat interface. This chat-driven orchestration pattern is becoming increasingly common, enabling attackers to manage their operations with agility and stealth.
Beyond its DDoS capabilities, the later NULLZEREPTOOL variant introduces WiFi and Bluetooth attack routines. These modules leverage external tools like aireplay-ng, netsh wlan, nmcli, hcxdumptool, hcxpcapngtool, and hashcat. They are designed to deauthenticate clients, capture saved WiFi passwords, and attempt dictionary-based cracking of captured handshakes. However, their effectiveness is contingent on the host environment and available hardware.
The framework also defines a BOTNET_HIERARCHY structure, featuring Flask endpoints for slave registration, task assignment, and reporting. While commands for tasks like wifi_scan and browser_steal are defined, Flare's analysis indicates that the necessary client binaries are missing, meaning this distributed botnet architecture currently exists only in theory. The framework's design highlights the growing trend of utilizing readily available platforms like Telegram and public proxy lists to construct sophisticated and agile attack surfaces.
Security teams are advised to monitor for mixed HTTP methods with random headers, high-volume UDP and TCP bursts targeting common ports (80, 443), and DNS or NTP amplification traffic. Organizations should also establish baselines for normal application behavior, deploy robust DDoS and Layer 7 protections, and be prepared to trace flood origins through proxy layers, rather than solely focusing on individual IP addresses.