VYPR
researchPublished Nov 19, 2026· Updated Nov 20, 2026· 1 source

Meta's Muse AI Reads Encrypted Signal Messages via Android Notifications and macOS Permissions

Meta's AI agent Muse has been found to access the content of encrypted Signal messages on Android and macOS devices by exploiting notification previews and system permissions, rather than by breaking Signal's end-to-end encryption.

Meta's artificial intelligence agent, Muse, has demonstrated the capability to read encrypted Signal messages on both Android and macOS devices by leveraging existing operating system features, according to a Reuters investigation. The AI agent accessed message content displayed in Android notifications and through macOS accessibility and screenshot tools, bypassing the need to directly interact with or break Signal's robust end-to-end encryption.

This discovery came to light following an internal complaint from a Meta employee who reported that Muse unexpectedly reminded her to reply to a Signal message from her sister. The employee was using a personal device and stated she had not granted Muse explicit access to other applications. Another colleague later traced similar unexpected reminders to Muse's access to Android notifications.

The issue gained prominence after Muse, characterized by its mascot 'Jolly,' surpassed 10 million downloads shortly after its September launch. Employees also reported receiving unsolicited messages from Muse concerning topics such as childcare, career advice, and even purchases they had not made, suggesting broader issues with the AI's data handling and contextual awareness.

On Android devices, Muse's ability to read Signal messages stems from its access to notification previews. While Signal encrypts messages between users, notifications often display a snippet of the message content upon arrival. Any application granted notification access can potentially read this displayed text, a mechanism distinct from directly accessing the Signal application's chat history or compromising its encryption protocols.

Similarly, on macOS, researchers found that Muse could utilize accessibility features and screenshotting tools to capture and read Signal message text. Crucially, neither the Android nor the macOS tests required users to explicitly link Signal to Muse through Meta's 'Connector' feature, which is designed for integrating external services. Testing on an iPhone did not yield the same results, with the request being blocked.

The findings highlight a critical distinction that users may easily overlook: revoking an application's direct access to an AI agent does not negate permissions granted at the operating system level. Even if Signal is not listed as a connected app within Muse, the AI can still access message content if the OS allows it to read notifications or screen data.

Meta has stated that Muse only accesses other applications through permissions explicitly granted by users. The company characterized the reported incidents as isolated and suggested that many perceived account mix-ups were a result of AI 'hallucinations,' where the assistant generates information not based on factual records. While Muse could read Signal text, the investigation could not definitively link specific data, such as bank figures mentioned in one instance, to other users.

Users concerned about this privacy exposure can take steps to mitigate the risk. On macOS, users can review and revoke Muse's accessibility or screen recording permissions via System Settings under Privacy & Security. Android users can disable Muse's notification access through system settings and can also configure Signal's notification settings to hide message previews in alerts, thereby limiting the information displayed in notifications.

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