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breachPublished Oct 7, 2026· Updated Oct 9, 2026· 7 sources

Hackers Compromise ccTLD Registries to Issue Fake Google HTTPS Certificates

Attackers gained control of the .gh, .sl, and .as country-code top-level domains, enabling them to issue fraudulent HTTPS certificates for Google domains and other major organizations.

In a sophisticated attack targeting the integrity of internet trust, threat actors have successfully compromised the operators of three country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs): .gh (Ghana), .sl (Sierra Leone), and .as (American Samoa). This breach granted them the ability to alter DNS records and, critically, to obtain unauthorized HTTPS certificates for domains belonging to Google and other large organizations.

Google disclosed the incident, emphasizing that its own systems were not compromised. The attackers exploited their control over the ccTLD registries to manipulate the Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure. By controlling the authoritative DNS records for domains under these TLDs, they could then trick certificate authorities into issuing fraudulent SSL/TLS certificates.

These certificates, when issued, would appear legitimate to browsers and other clients, potentially allowing attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, intercept sensitive traffic, or impersonate legitimate services. The compromise of ccTLD registries represents a significant threat, as these domains are fundamental to the global internet's naming and security infrastructure.

The implications of such an attack are far-reaching. While Google stated its systems were unaffected, the ability to obtain fraudulent certificates for its domains could have enabled sophisticated phishing campaigns, espionage, or disruption of services if exploited further. The attackers' motives remain under investigation, but the technical capability demonstrated points to a well-resourced and knowledgeable adversary.

This incident highlights a critical vulnerability in the hierarchical trust model of the internet. Certificate Authorities (CAs) rely on the accuracy of DNS information to validate domain ownership before issuing certificates. When the authoritative source for that DNS information—in this case, the ccTLD registry—is compromised, the entire validation process can be subverted.

While Google's infrastructure and security measures appear to have mitigated the direct impact on its services, the broader implications for other organizations and the internet's trust ecosystem are significant. The incident serves as a stark reminder of the need for robust security practices not only for end-users and software vendors but also for the foundational infrastructure providers that underpin global connectivity.

Further investigation is ongoing to determine the full extent of the compromise and to implement necessary remediation steps to prevent similar incidents. The security community is closely monitoring developments, as the compromise of ccTLD registries could have cascading effects on internet security and user trust.

The new article provides further technical details on how the attackers exploited the compromised .gh, .sl, and .as domain registries. It explains that the attackers altered authoritative DNS records, which allowed them to bypass the domain control validation process used by certificate authorities. While Chrome automatically blocked the identified certificates and Google worked with CAs to revoke those for its properties, the full scope of affected domains and the attackers' initial access method remain unclear.

This new report from The Register provides further technical details on the attack, noting that the hijacked top-level domains included .gh (Ghana), .sl (Sierra Leone), and .as (American Samoa). Google's security team confirmed that during these hijacks, attackers modified authoritative DNS records and obtained unauthorized HTTPS certificates covering several Google domains, as well as domains belonging to other organizations. While Chrome blocked the counterfeit certificates, Google emphasizes that browser-side intervention should not be solely relied upon for protection, as it may not cover all users or browsers.

The new article provides specific details on the certificates issued, noting that Let's Encrypt issued 11 of the 12 unauthorized certificates for Google and YouTube domains across the .gh, .sl, and .as TLDs between September 22 and 27. It also identifies ZeroSSL as the issuer of one certificate. Furthermore, the article details the revocation dates for these certificates, with some being revoked as early as September 26 and others as late as October 1, highlighting varying response times.

The Infosecurity Magazine article further details Google's response, noting that Chrome blocked the unauthorized certificates via CRLSets and that Google collaborated with certificate authorities to revoke them for broader protection. It also highlights that the attack did not involve a compromise of Google's own systems, nor did it indicate any impropriety from the issuing certificate authorities.

The new article from Malwarebytes Labs elaborates on the technical mechanism of the DNS hijack, explaining how attackers leveraged control over the .gh, .sl, and .as country-code domain namespaces to pass domain verification checks required by certificate authorities. It also details Google's response, including blocking certificates in Chrome and working with authorities, while emphasizing that the core issue remains an infrastructure-level problem requiring a broader fix beyond browser-specific interventions.

Google has confirmed its own domains were among those affected by the recent ccTLD hijackings of .gh, .sl, and .as. While the initial report focused on the technical mechanism of obtaining fraudulent HTTPS certificates, Google's disclosure details their proactive steps to block these certificates in Chrome and work with Certificate Authorities for revocation. They also noted that other global brands and online services were impacted, urging domain owners to monitor Certificate Transparency logs and implement restrictive CAA DNS records.

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