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patchPublished Nov 16, 2026· Updated Nov 21, 2026· 1 source

Five Vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs Allow Root Access, Data Exposure

Rapid7 has disclosed five vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs, enabling an attacker with view-only access to escalate privileges to root within the DocumentServer container and expose sensitive data.

Rapid7 researchers have uncovered a critical chain of five vulnerabilities within ONLYOFFICE Docs that could allow an attacker with only view-only access to a document to gain root-level control over the DocumentServer container and exfiltrate sensitive server files and document data. The vulnerabilities, detailed in a Rapid7 blog post, were found during research into Zimbra Collaboration Suite and have since been patched by ONLYOFFICE.

The most severe of these flaws, CVE-2026-110385, involves a conversion parameter injection and code execution vulnerability in DocBuilder, carrying a CVSS score of 8.7. This is combined with CVE-2026-113627, a native file read and session JWT forgery flaw (CVSS 7.1), and CVE-2026-97727, a complete-save format path traversal and arbitrary file write vulnerability (CVSS 6.5). Two additional vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-113630 (root-helper command injection, CVSS 7.8) and CVE-2026-113631 (view-only export of non-rendered document data, CVSS 6.5), complete the exploit chain.

An attacker can leverage these vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary operating system commands as the 'ds' user, which can then be escalated to root privileges within the official DocumentServer container. This level of access allows for complete compromise of the containerized environment. Furthermore, the flaws enable the exposure of server files and document data that would not normally be visible to a viewer, even if document downloading is disabled.

ONLYOFFICE has acknowledged and fixed all five vulnerabilities in Document Server version 10.0, released on October 23, 2026. The changelog for this version details the security enhancements implemented. Rapid7 has also made proof-of-concept (PoC) code publicly available on their GitHub repository, allowing security professionals to test and verify the fixes.

The research was conducted on the official onlyoffice/documentserver:9.4.0 Docker image, running version 9.4.0-129 of the DocumentServer package. The testing environment was configured with default security settings, including JWT validation, and no modifications were made to vendor code or authentication checks. The exploit chain was demonstrated on this specific version, though the broader range of affected versions is not yet fully known.

One exploit chain involves using the DocBuilder feature to read sensitive files, including the session JWT signing key. This key can then be used to forge credentials, granting the attacker elevated permissions for document manipulation. Another path exploits a failure in DocBuilder authorization when WOPI (Web Application Open Platform Interface) is enabled, allowing unauthenticated access if an attacker-controlled source is permitted by the IP filter.

Even when document downloads are disabled, a viewer can still obtain a reconstructed DOCX file containing custom XML, properties, and field instructions that were never rendered or displayed. This data leakage can reveal sensitive information embedded within documents.

This discovery highlights the critical importance of thorough security testing for collaborative document editing platforms. The ability for an attacker with minimal privileges to escalate to root and access sensitive data underscores the need for vendors to implement robust input validation and secure handling of authentication tokens and file operations.

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