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advisoryPublished Jul 9, 2026· 1 source

EU 'Chat Control' Snooping Measure Revived After Vote Fails to Block It

European lawmakers narrowly failed to block the reintroduction of an interim rule allowing tech platforms to voluntarily scan chats for child sexual abuse material, moving the controversial 'Chat Control' measure closer to revival.

An attempt by European parliamentarians to block the reintroduction of an interim rule that permits tech companies to scan chats for evidence of child sexual abuse has failed, despite securing more votes against it than in favor. Commonly referred to as Chat Control, or Chat Control 1.0, the interim rule acts as a derogation from the ePrivacy Directive, allowing online communications platforms to voluntarily detect, report, and remove child sexual abuse material (CSAM). This measure originally expired on April 3, 2026, after its initial introduction in August 2021.

Today's vote saw 314 politicians vote to scrap Chat Control, while 276 voted to keep it. However, the attempt to abolish the interim rule failed because it did not reach the required threshold of 360 MEPs needed to reject the Council of the European Union's position. Consequently, the effort to abolish the interim rule failed, despite a majority of voting MEPs opposing it.

Further complicating matters, a separate vote aimed at limiting scanning to accounts identified by the judiciary also failed to achieve the necessary majority. This effectively leaves the door open for the scanning of all accounts without a warrant. While MEPs did manage to secure a majority for excluding end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) platforms from Chat Control's scanning provisions, the practical impact of this exclusion may be limited, as providers are generally unable to inspect message contents in transit when E2EE is properly implemented.

The legislation that is now moving toward reintroduction is largely the same as the 2021 version, Chat Control 1.0, but without explicit legal permission to scan E2EE messages. The European Parliament's amended position will now be sent back to the Council of the European Union, which has a three-month window to approve or reject the legislation. If the Council cannot accept all the amendments, a conciliation committee will be convened to reach a resolution.

Critics, such as former MEP Patrick Breyer, have decried Chat Control as a vehicle for "suspicionless mass surveillance" and a smokescreen that delays meaningful action against the spread of CSAM online. Breyer stated that the measure's progression against the will of the majority of voting MEPs is a "farce" that damages democracy and harms children, jeopardizing the passage of a genuine, permanent child protection regulation.

The core of the Chat Control debate lies in the persistent conflict between the public's right to privacy and law enforcement's need to access evidence to prosecute individuals involved in the creation, possession, or distribution of CSAM. Chat Control 1.0 was introduced as an interim measure, predicated on the assumption that the more comprehensive Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR), also known as Chat Control 2.0, would be passed in a timely manner.

The CSAR is intended to serve as the EU's permanent framework for detecting and tackling online child sexual abuse. Unlike the interim measure, it would establish lasting obligations for platforms to assess and mitigate the risks associated with their services being used to spread CSAM or facilitate grooming. However, the Council's desire for laws that preserve E2EE while allowing client-side scanning for harmful material remains a contentious point, as many argue these two goals are fundamentally incompatible.

Client-side scanning, while technically feasible, is highly controversial because it breaks the principle of fully encrypted communications without exposing message contents in transit. Proponents argue it offers a balance between privacy and child protection, allowing analysis on the device. Privacy advocates, however, warn that the same technology could be repurposed by governments for mass surveillance. The CSAR is still undergoing trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council, and member states, with no agreement reached on its final shape.

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