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researchPublished Nov 20, 2026· 1 source

Com-Affiliated Actors Escalate Vishing Attacks for Data Theft and Extortion

Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 details sophisticated vishing campaigns by Com-affiliated threat actors targeting healthcare, finance, and legal sectors for data theft and extortion.

Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 has identified and responded to a significant increase in vishing (voice phishing) attacks orchestrated by threat actors affiliated with "Com." These campaigns, which have intensified in recent months, are designed to steal sensitive data and extort victim organizations, primarily in the U.S., UK, and Australia. The targeted industries are data-rich, including financial services, healthcare, and legal services, making them lucrative targets for these cybercriminals.

The threat landscape includes several named actors and activity clusters, such as Bling Libra (also known as ShinyHunters), and various activity clusters like Redact, Pink, Falcon, and Helix. Unit 42 also highlights two newly discovered clusters, Vortex (CL-CRI-1264) and Cinder (CL-CRI-1274), which show overlap with Google's tracking of UNC6671. These actors leverage a consistent playbook, often utilizing infrastructure hosted on services like NiceNIC and Cloudflare, with domains themed around reports and claims to appear legitimate.

The Vortex cluster, identified in September 2026, has shown a particular focus on healthcare and pharmaceutical organizations. Attackers initiate access by posing as internal IT support, directing employees to specially crafted subdomains. These domains act as adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) proxies, enabling real-time capture of user credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) approvals from both corporate workstations and personal mobile devices. A concerning tactic observed is the rapid enrollment of an unauthorized MFA device, often reusing a single device like a 'Pixel 10a,' to maintain persistence.

Following initial access and credential theft, the Vortex actors automate data exfiltration from Microsoft 365 environments, targeting mailboxes, OneDrive, and SharePoint content using Python scripts. Once data is exfiltrated, they communicate directly with employees via Microsoft Teams, claiming data theft and directing them to negotiation sites hosted on the Tor network. This direct communication aims to pressure victims into paying ransoms.

Similarly, the Cinder cluster, also identified in September 2026, employs vishing for initial access. They exploit a "keep me signed in" session token to maintain access without re-prompting for Duo MFA, replaying the token from proxy infrastructure. Data collection and exfiltration from SharePoint and OneDrive are performed using Python scripts and the Microsoft Graph SDK. Extortion messages are then disseminated internally via email and Microsoft Teams, again guiding recipients to a Tor-based negotiation site.

During an investigation linked to the CL-CRI-1192 (Helix) activity cluster, Unit 42 discovered a malicious browser extension disguised as "Google Chrome." This extension, not available on the Chrome Web Store, was downloaded from an attacker-controlled server and required manual sideloading via Developer Mode. Its naming convention was likely chosen to bypass built-in browser warnings and deceive users into installing it, potentially leading to further credential theft or session hijacking.

These "Com"-affiliated campaigns represent a persistent and evolving threat, adapting their tactics to bypass MFA and exfiltrate data from cloud environments. The use of vishing as a primary entry vector, coupled with sophisticated social engineering and automated exfiltration techniques, highlights the need for robust security awareness training and advanced threat detection capabilities. Organizations are urged to implement layered security measures, including advanced endpoint protection, URL filtering, and identity threat detection, to defend against these high-profile heists.

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