Cinny
by Cinnyapp
Source repositories
CVEs (1)
| CVE | Sev | Risk | CVSS | EPSS | KEV | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-42553 | hig | 0.45 | — | — | May 7, 2026 | ### Impact A remote authenticated attacker who shares a room with a victim and has permissions to create room emotes (for example in a DM) can cause the victim's client to send their Matrix access token to an attacker-controlled server. This occurs when the victim opens the emoji or sticker picker for the room containing a malicious emote pack. The root causes are: (1) an incorrect fallback in EmojiBoard that uses untrusted `pack.meta.avatar` (user-controlled) without converting/validating it as an MXC URL, allowing arbitrary HTTP(S) URLs to be used; and (2) the service worker attaching the user's Authorization bearer token to all outbound GET requests whose URL contains `/_matrix/client/v1/media/download` or `/_matrix/client/v1/media/thumbnail` without verifying the request host matches the configured homeserver origin. An attacker-controlled URL containing those path fragments and permissive CORS will receive the victim's Authorization header (access token). Impacted users: anybody using affected Cinny web app versions who opens the emoji/sticker picker in a room containing a malicious emote pack and who is logged in (authenticated). ### Patches Version with fixes: https://github.com/cinnyapp/cinny/releases/tag/v4.10.3 |
- risk 0.45cvss —epss —
### Impact A remote authenticated attacker who shares a room with a victim and has permissions to create room emotes (for example in a DM) can cause the victim's client to send their Matrix access token to an attacker-controlled server. This occurs when the victim opens the emoji or sticker picker for the room containing a malicious emote pack. The root causes are: (1) an incorrect fallback in EmojiBoard that uses untrusted `pack.meta.avatar` (user-controlled) without converting/validating it as an MXC URL, allowing arbitrary HTTP(S) URLs to be used; and (2) the service worker attaching the user's Authorization bearer token to all outbound GET requests whose URL contains `/_matrix/client/v1/media/download` or `/_matrix/client/v1/media/thumbnail` without verifying the request host matches the configured homeserver origin. An attacker-controlled URL containing those path fragments and permissive CORS will receive the victim's Authorization header (access token). Impacted users: anybody using affected Cinny web app versions who opens the emoji/sticker picker in a room containing a malicious emote pack and who is logged in (authenticated). ### Patches Version with fixes: https://github.com/cinnyapp/cinny/releases/tag/v4.10.3