VYPR
Get started

Openvswitch

Sign in to watch

by Openvswitch

Source repositories

CVEs (9)

CVESevRiskCVSSEPSSKEVPublishedDescription
CVE-2017-9265Cri0.649.80.02May 29, 2017In Open vSwitch (OvS) v2.7.0, there is a buffer over-read while parsing the group mod OpenFlow message sent from the controller in `lib/ofp-util.c` in the function `ofputil_pull_ofp15_group_mod`.
CVE-2017-9264Cri0.649.80.01May 29, 2017In lib/conntrack.c in the firewall implementation in Open vSwitch (OvS) 2.6.1, there is a buffer over-read while parsing malformed TCP, UDP, and IPv6 packets in the functions `extract_l3_ipv6`, `extract_l4_tcp`, and `extract_l4_udp` that can be triggered remotely.
CVE-2017-9214Cri0.649.80.04May 23, 2017In Open vSwitch (OvS) 2.7.0, while parsing an OFPT_QUEUE_GET_CONFIG_REPLY type OFP 1.0 message, there is a buffer over-read that is caused by an unsigned integer underflow in the function `ofputil_pull_queue_get_config_reply10` in `lib/ofp-util.c`.
CVE-2016-10377Hig0.578.80.00May 29, 2017In Open vSwitch (OvS) 2.5.0, a malformed IP packet can cause the switch to read past the end of the packet buffer due to an unsigned integer underflow in `lib/flow.c` in the function `miniflow_extract`, permitting remote bypass of the access control list enforced by the switch.
CVE-2017-9263Med0.426.50.00May 29, 2017In Open vSwitch (OvS) 2.7.0, while parsing an OpenFlow role status message, there is a call to the abort() function for undefined role status reasons in the function `ofp_print_role_status_message` in `lib/ofp-print.c` that may be leveraged toward a remote DoS attack by a malicious switch.
CVE-2017-14970Med0.385.90.01Oct 2, 2017In lib/ofp-util.c in Open vSwitch (OvS) before 2.8.1, there are multiple memory leaks while parsing malformed OpenFlow group mod messages. NOTE: the vendor disputes the relevance of this report, stating "it can only be triggered by an OpenFlow controller, but OpenFlow controllers have much more direct and powerful ways to force Open vSwitch to allocate memory, such as by inserting flows into the flow table."
CVE-2023-538430.00—0.00Dec 9, 2025In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: reject negative ifindex Recent changes in net-next (commit 759ab1edb56c ("net: store netdevs in an xarray")) refactored the handling of pre-assigned ifindexes and let syzbot surface a latent problem in ovs. ovs does not validate ifindex, making it possible to create netdev ports with negative ifindex values. It's easy to repro with YNL: $ ./cli.py --spec netlink/specs/ovs_datapath.yaml \ --do new \ --json '{"upcall-pid": 1, "name":"my-dp"}' $ ./cli.py --spec netlink/specs/ovs_vport.yaml \ --do new \ --json '{"upcall-pid": "00000001", "name": "some-port0", "dp-ifindex":3,"ifindex":4294901760,"type":2}' $ ip link show -65536: some-port0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000 link/ether 7a:48:21:ad:0b:fb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff ... Validate the inputs. Now the second command correctly returns: $ ./cli.py --spec netlink/specs/ovs_vport.yaml \ --do new \ --json '{"upcall-pid": "00000001", "name": "some-port0", "dp-ifindex":3,"ifindex":4294901760,"type":2}' lib.ynl.NlError: Netlink error: Numerical result out of range nl_len = 108 (92) nl_flags = 0x300 nl_type = 2 error: -34 extack: {'msg': 'integer out of range', 'unknown': [[type:4 len:36] b'\x0c\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x00\x03\x00\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\x01\x00\x08\x00\x00\x00'], 'bad-attr': '.ifindex'} Accept 0 since it used to be silently ignored.
CVE-2025-402540.00—0.00Dec 4, 2025In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: remove never-working support for setting nsh fields The validation of the set(nsh(...)) action is completely wrong. It runs through the nsh_key_put_from_nlattr() function that is the same function that validates NSH keys for the flow match and the push_nsh() action. However, the set(nsh(...)) has a very different memory layout. Nested attributes in there are doubled in size in case of the masked set(). That makes proper validation impossible. There is also confusion in the code between the 'masked' flag, that says that the nested attributes are doubled in size containing both the value and the mask, and the 'is_mask' that says that the value we're parsing is the mask. This is causing kernel crash on trying to write into mask part of the match with SW_FLOW_KEY_PUT() during validation, while validate_nsh() doesn't allocate any memory for it: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1c2383067 P4D 1c2383067 PUD 20b703067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 8 UID: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #107 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:nsh_key_put_from_nlattr+0x19d/0x610 [openvswitch] Call Trace: <TASK> validate_nsh+0x60/0x90 [openvswitch] validate_set.constprop.0+0x270/0x3c0 [openvswitch] __ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x477/0x860 [openvswitch] ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x8d/0x100 [openvswitch] ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x1cc/0x310 [openvswitch] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xdb/0x130 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x220 genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x280/0x3b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430 ____sys_sendmsg+0x36b/0x3a0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x87/0xd0 __sys_sendmsg+0x6d/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The third issue with this process is that while trying to convert the non-masked set into masked one, validate_set() copies and doubles the size of the OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH as if it didn't have any nested attributes. It should be copying each nested attribute and doubling them in size independently. And the process must be properly reversed during the conversion back from masked to a non-masked variant during the flow dump. In the end, the only two outcomes of trying to use this action are either validation failure or a kernel crash. And if somehow someone manages to install a flow with such an action, it will most definitely not do what it is supposed to, since all the keys and the masks are mixed up. Fixing all the issues is a complex task as it requires re-writing most of the validation code. Given that and the fact that this functionality never worked since introduction, let's just remove it altogether. It's better to re-introduce it later with a proper implementation instead of trying to fix it in stable releases.
CVE-2012-34490.00—0.00Aug 7, 2012Open vSwitch 1.4.2 uses world writable permissions for (1) /var/lib/openvswitch/pki/controllerca/incoming/ and (2) /var/lib/openvswitch/pki/switchca/incoming/, which allows local users to delete and overwrite arbitrary files.