@luminarycloudinternal/frodo

Details

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (58ed68e675b2b6cde30e6b7c8e34077eda805a4bde64ca7cd2c68c6f4370ee5f)
Package published under a scope shadowing internal Luminary Cloud packages (@luminarycloudinternal) at version 9999.0.1 — the canonical dependency-confusion shape designed to win version resolution over a private internal package of the same name. On install, postinstall.js (line 8) performs an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded external host (poc-luminary-npm-1782987043.testingboxes.com) carrying installer-owned CI and host identifiers: GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_SHA, GITHUB_REF, GITHUB_WORKFLOW, RUNNER_NAME, os.hostname(), and npm user-agent. When a build system misresolves the internal name to the public registry, this postinstall runs automatically and discloses internal repository, workflow, commit, and runner identifiers to a third-party endpoint. The package self-identifies as a Bugcrowd research canary, but self-labeling does not change the mechanism: installer-owned metadata leaves the machine at install time to a non-first-party destination via a namespace-squat.

## Source: ghsa-malware (9a690eb1bc2a09fccfb06b9531bbd7ec4da297737e700bd165096270b54c9995)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Compromised versions (3)

• 9999.0.1
• 9999.0.2
• 9999.0.3

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.