@marketfront/footer

Details

The @marketfront/footer package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' (marketfront@tutamail.com) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (df4b30bc8f0ba99a70d152a0b6aa01a9acc3605505c3c3c31c8c03cc5ea4a639)
On `npm install`, scripts/postinstall.js — a 160KB obfuscator.io-style bundle with an RC4-decoded string array and runtime-assembled identifiers — collects installer-side secrets and host identity and tunnels them out over DNS to an attacker-controlled resolver. Data collection covers the entirety of `process.env` (bulk CI/build secrets such as AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, database credentials), host identifiers from `os.userInfo()`/`os.hostname()`/`os.networkInterfaces()`, Windows environment variables (USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA, PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE), and the contents of well-known home-directory secret files including ~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.npmrc, ~/.docker, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.netrc, and browser/shell profile paths. The harvested payload is JSON-serialized, gzipped via `zlib.gzipSync`, XOR-keyed, base32-encoded, split into 50-character chunks, and each chunk is emitted as a DNS TXT query of the form `<seq>.<total>.<idx>.<rand>.<subdomain>.<attacker-host>` using a `dns.Resolver`'s `resolveTxt` — a channel specifically chosen to bypass HTTP egress filtering common on CI/build networks. The package's declared purpose ("internal database utilities with connection pooling, query builder and migration support") is a cover story: `main` points at `dist/index.js`, which only re-exports an absent `src/index.js`, so the tarball ships no functional library code — only the obfuscated postinstall. The `@marketfront` scope and `marketfront.io` publisher metadata additionally have the shape of an internal-name impersonation targeting a specific organization (dependency-confusion pattern).

Compromised versions (1)

• 7.0.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.