@marketfront/advertisingdevtool

Details

The @marketfront/advertisingdevtool package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' (marketfront@tutamail.com) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.

The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.

The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (6192642b09b16f0753d464d540aba9f3a6bc7946755d5aa8727889e6434e8774)
The package declares postinstall: node scripts/postinstall.js and ships a 166KB obfuscator.io-style bundle (string-array, RC4-decoded literals) that runs automatically on npm install. On execution it (1) collects host reconnaissance — OS hostname/arch/platform/type/release/version, os.userInfo(), CPU info, network interfaces, npm_config_user_agent, and Windows-specific USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, TEMP, PROGRAMDATA — and dumps process.env in full (CI tokens, AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, and similar secrets); (2) scans the user's home directory (paths derived from os.homedir() including.aws,.ssh,.npmrc,.config, and browser profile directories) via fs.readdirSync + fs.readFileSync and packs their contents into the payload; (3) encrypts the payload and exfiltrates over two parallel channels — DNS-tunnel using dns.Resolver.resolve4() with base32-encoded XOR/RC4-encrypted chunks embedded as subdomain labels (bypasses HTTP egress filtering) and an HTTPS POST fallback with the same encrypted body; and (4) gates the entire payload behind an anti-analysis IIFE that inspects process.execArgv and process.env.NODE_OPTIONS for --inspect/--inspect-brk and runs a wall-clock timing loop to detect debugging, aborting on non-clean hosts. The package presents itself as an 'Internal configuration loader with env, vault and remote config support' and points at nonexistent internal infrastructure (github.marketfront.io, npm.marketfront.io, jira.marketfront.io) — the classic dependency-confusion cover story targeting organizations that may have a private @marketfront scope.

Compromised versions (1)

• 7.0.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.