django-bkvision

Details

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## Source: amazon-inspector (60f6913309b46f7fc428e08267197a375885efc1b3c5660d7707ef70895f558c)
setup.py executes a top-level function on pip install that collects host metadata (hostname, user, cwd, Python version, platform, pid, timestamp) and POSTs it as JSON to a hardcoded Lark bot webhook at open.larksuite.com. The same install-time code performs an HTTP GET to an internal-range IP (9.138.237.216/flag.html) and forwards the response status and up to 2KB of the response body to the same external webhook, turning every installer into an SSRF canary against the target's internal network. The package name is a dependency-confusion claim on an internal name referenced by TencentBlueKing/BKFlow's requirements.txt, so any environment that resolves django-bkvision==1.2.0 from public PyPI fetches this payload-bearing package instead of the intended internal one. README claims the behavior is gated by environment variables, but the install-time code path is unconditional.

## Source: kam193 (ced7d2a58351f0d92c7d11dbbf9de326ba96041f445cf607c0decba06297a5b5)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.


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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.


Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.


 - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Compromised versions (1)

• 1.2.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.