chain-chai-test

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (4287ff6637bb0d3109dcdc3082aece79d69deca2a3580ebf850ec1c13e8a3e00)
chain-chai-test@1.3.5 advertises itself as a pino-style logger (keywords fast/logger/stream/json, exported alias module.exports.pino = middleware, pino-pretty visual assets) but the exported middleware factory spawns a detached `node lib/caller.js` process. caller.js performs `axios.get` against https://jsonkeeper.com/b/EXSIF (with a base64-obfuscated sibling URL https://jsonkeeper.com/b/ZK45J in lib/const.js, decoded from `aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1pLNDVK`), reads `.data.cookie` from the response, and passes that string to `new Function.constructor("require", s)` invoked with the host process's `require`. That executes attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node.js privileges in the consuming application. The fetch destination is an anonymous, mutable JSON-paste host, the URL is duplicated in obfuscated form to conceal the C2 endpoint, and the package name and exported API impersonate the legitimate pino logger to lure installers. Unrelated dependencies (request, sqlite3, parse-json) further indicate this is not a logger implementation.

## Source: ghsa-malware (763b4853da8c66a8801a7e33d815b99195a72b2343cc4d70a54b9eaa44108e90)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Compromised versions (1)

• 1.3.5

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.