fastgptmini

Details

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## Source: amazon-inspector (4da10d62527ca4b69f4458b6a01c77f01af42c5a1631d5cc6f207070d1ade20d)
setup.py fetches an opaque file from https://tmpfiles.org/dl/wJwhUXDhUK6M/zvgfsj.txt (an anonymous, throwaway file-sharing host) during `pip install`, writes the bytes to `python.bat` in the current working directory, and executes them via `os.system("cmd /c python.bat")`. The URL is unpinned, no hash or signature verification is performed, the destination is not associated with the package publisher, and the fetched content is handed directly to a shell — a canonical install-time dropper. The package ships no real functionality (src/ contains only the egg-info directory) and uses placeholder metadata (Name/Author/Summary all set to 'FastGPTMini' with no homepage, URL, or email), consistent with a name-confusion lure targeting developers searching for FastGPT/GPT tooling. Any machine running `pip install FastGPTMini` will fetch and execute attacker-controlled code with the user's privileges.

## Source: kam193 (3cca907106c3dceb5276e9bdbf8799367b44df9e12fe12098dd3ed215bb4f3b0)
During installation, the code downloads an obfuscated script, which attempts to tamper with Defender exclusions paths and then downloads a malicious executable


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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-06-fastgptmini


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - Downloads and executes a remote executable.


 - malware


 - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.


 - obfuscation

Compromised versions (6)

• 2.21
• 2.22
• 2.23
• 2.24
• 2.25
• 2.26

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.