@0xlr/supabase-db

Details

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## Source: amazon-inspector (0feb7f8ea3069b0e830043fea195c088ea28709cc18a32676f389c61a15fc84c)
On `npm install`, the package's postinstall.js script enumerates all of process.env and collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), username, homedir, cwd, argv, platform), then POSTs the JSON payload over HTTPS to `rytxau88zxh61dw6qz4yn19naeg54vsk.oastify.com` (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band domain). Because this fires automatically during install, any CI tokens, npm tokens, cloud credentials (AWS_*, GCP, Azure), and other secrets present in the installer's environment are exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled host. The package also exhibits a dependency-confusion / namespace-squat shape: it self-describes as 'Placeholder reservation - company should register supabase-db' and is published at version 999.0.0 under the @0xlr scope, designed to win resolution against an internally-named `supabase-db` dependency.

Compromised versions (1)

• 999.0.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.