@demica/core

Details

Dep-confusion squat of internal @demica/core at sentinel high version 99.99.100 + auto-exec postinstall (canary.js) beaconing to RAW IP 157.230.17.236:80/dc. Sentinel-high-version + auto-exec beacon = MALICIOUS per operator policy (c913); "authorized benign canary" framing does NOT downgrade, raw-IP dest matches masterkrweb. 6-pkg @demica canary campaign.

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (3abd78892d57868223d66ae70f269e5088d5801f5beaa41418146172a3e5e338)
Package self-describes as a dependency-confusion canary targeting the @demica scope and ships a postinstall hook that fires automatically on `npm install`. `package.json` declares `scripts.postinstall: node canary.js postinstall`, and canary.js lines 18-22 issue an HTTP GET to the bare IP 157.230.17.236 on port 80 at path `/dc?...` with the package name, version, a nonce, and the lifecycle phase. Any machine that resolves @demica/core@99.99.99 from the public registry — typically because an internal build accidentally pulled the public squat instead of the private @demica/core — silently announces itself to the operator of 157.230.17.236, disclosing the installer's egress IP, the presence of the @demica internal namespace in the build, and confirmation that the dependency-confusion attack succeeded. The beacon body is metadata-only (no env/filesystem/credential reads), but the install-time outbound HTTP to a hardcoded attacker-controlled bare IP, fired without consent on default install, is the canonical dependency-confusion exploitation primitive and gives the publisher exactly the reconnaissance signal needed to identify and escalate against vulnerable internal build pipelines.

Compromised versions (2)

• 99.99.99
• 99.99.100

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.