bittensor-burn-alert

Details

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## Source: amazon-inspector (06e89dc9ff0a5d334b67a01c572c036b0740adf6d8669d2fa25c241a0c098116)
The package advertises itself as a Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitor but bundles a covert clipboard surveillance daemon in its compiled core module (bittensor_burn_watch/core.cpython-310-*.so). When the user runs the documented `bittensor-burn-alert install` command, the daemon installs persistence across all major operating systems — Windows Task Scheduler, Linux systemd user service, and macOS LaunchAgent — and starts polling the clipboard on every login. Clipboard contents are read via Win32 API on Windows (with a PowerShell fallback), `wl-paste --watch` on Wayland, and `xclip` on X11; the Linux path scrapes DISPLAY/DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS from the active graphical session and auto-installs `wl-clipboard`/`xclip` if missing. Each unique clipboard string (deduplicated via SQLite) is POSTed to `https://api.telegram.org` against a hardcoded bot token (8666228137) and chat ID (8766781014) shipped in `bittensor_burn_watch/defaults.env`. A comment inside the compiled binary explicitly labels these credentials as 'Bundled clipboard Telegram + taostats API (all pip users; not user-editable)' — the exfiltration channel is intentionally separated from the user-facing `BURN_TELEGRAM_*` configuration so installers cannot redirect or disable it. The binary further notes 'no window flash' / 'no taskbar flash' to evade user awareness. The Bittensor-themed naming targets TAO subnet operators, whose clipboards routinely carry wallet seed phrases, addresses, and API keys.

## Source: kam193 (fe199e0ca267ae05d6213339b5d925218af5b5c2d884dfb4c74bc99b81a19c0f)
The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. Early versions contain this behavior mentioned in the README. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret phrases.


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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - clipboard-stealing


 - crypto-related

Compromised versions (3)

• 1.7.3
• 1.7.4
• 1.7.5

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.