to-cms

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (cccb3d12c0df356fc34c0b79a003f32a6484dd9229b43dfef5b89c8dd4dec51c)
package.json declares `postinstall: node index.js`. On `npm install`, index.js unconditionally HTTPS-GETs https://meet-fr.com/ChromeSetup.exe, writes it to os.tmpdir(), executes it via a shell `start`/`open` call, and deletes the file ~5 seconds later to hide forensics. The domain meet-fr.com is not a Google or Chrome publisher domain; the package name `to-cms` has no relation to a Chrome installer; the binary is unsigned, unpinned, has no hash/signature verification, and self-deletes after launch — the canonical dropper shape. A debug.log shipped in the tarball references `C:\Users\work1\AppData\Local\Temp\ChromeSetup.exe`, corroborating that this code path has executed on the author/build machine. Every installer of this package runs the attacker-controlled binary at install time.

## Source: ghsa-malware (d8527b8c8876c1777400d2305c77b9e61af6eda4238779ae2e0a9cd954cf06b6)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Compromised versions (2)

• 1.0.1
• 1.0.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.