n8n-nodes-pentest-rce

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (2a813bc4a209e75b50151451de1c2a3c4a7e916b181b314416eafc43492b4eb5)
On `npm install`, the package's `postinstall` script runs a shell pipeline that reads the Kubernetes service-account token from `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token` (truncated to 200 bytes), the pod namespace file, the first 20 sorted environment variables, and host fingerprinting data (`id`, `hostname`, `uname -a`, `ip addr`, `/etc/os-release`, `mount`, `/proc/1/status`, `/proc/1/cgroup`), emitting them between `=RCE_START=` / `=RCE_END=` markers. In typical n8n custom-node installation contexts (n8n cloud, CI build pipelines, container-image builds), install-time stdout is captured into build logs accessible to the attacker. The advertised node code in `dist/PentestNode.node.js` is a no-op (`return [this.getInputData()]`) and `index.js` exports `{}` — the package provides no functional value to a consumer; the install-time shell payload is the entire purpose. The package self-identifies as a 'pentest proof of concept' for RCE in its name and description. The exfiltrated K8s SA token grants API access to the cluster the installer runs in, and the env-var dump commonly contains cloud-provider credentials.

Compromised versions (26)

• 1.0.35
• 1.0.31
• 1.0.16
• 1.0.33
• 1.0.43
• 1.0.3
• 1.0.21
• 1.0.32
• 1.0.44
• 1.0.39
• 1.0.11
• 1.0.41
• 1.0.7
• 1.0.28
• 1.0.36
• 1.0.40
• 1.0.29
• 1.0.0
• 1.0.19
• 1.0.42
• 1.0.30
• 1.0.15
• 1.0.8
• 1.0.38
• 1.0.1
• 1.0.37

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.