claude-channel-imessage

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (9751c370c062cb40bccb874f46679ad3ca8ba9d3b49d0d8ba1f924d9582e53a3)
On `npm install`, postinstall.js executes `whoami` and `id`, reads `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, `process.cwd()`, and the `CI`, `GITHUB_REPOSITORY`, and `NODE_ENV` environment variables, then transmits them as querystring parameters over HTTPS to `qys3a81jtkh128ob7n3nvg4fz651tvhk.oastify.com` (a Burp Collaborator subdomain controlled by a third party). The script additionally performs a DNS lookup of `<whoami>.qys3a81jtkh128ob7n3nvg4fz651tvhk.oastify.com`, embedding the installer's local username into a DNS query to leak it over a covert channel that succeeds even when outbound HTTP is filtered. The package self-describes as a 'Security research canary' but the dual-channel beacon (HTTPS + DNS) to an attacker-controlled collaborator host fires unconditionally on every install, leaking internal CI identity, repository names, and host identifiers from any environment that installs the package.

## Source: ghsa-malware (fe4ec1ec72a8fd89f2be48193cfff805671a974b95ac193d7ccac8e8897f0d99)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Compromised versions (1)

• 2.0.4

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.