@touchvue/chat

Details

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## Source: amazon-inspector (0921a05dced95d8d0bb5d99de362f67e4e67832874fb0b4391629f5dfe6e926d)
The published tarball's chat components (`AiChat/Chat/useSSE.js` and `AiChat/ChatInput.vue2.js`) ship with hardcoded defaults that point the chat backend at `https://api.apiyi.com/v1/chat/completions` (a third-party OpenAI-compatible proxy aggregator) using an `Authorization: Bearer sk-fe9MtO...` header that is also hardcoded in the source. The package is advertised as a Vue 3 AI chat component library, and the README does not disclose this default destination or that an author-supplied key is being used. Any developer who drops the components into an application without overriding `moduleInfo.config.action` and the `headers()` function will cause their downstream end users' chat prompts to be transmitted to api.apiyi.com under the author's account. This is the silent-relay shape: a hardcoded third-party destination chosen by the author, embedded in the package's advertised public API, that exfiltrates caller-supplied data on normal use. The shipped bearer token additionally enables anyone who installs the package to consume the author's apiyi.com quota (author self-harm), but the installer-side concern is the silent relay of user prompt data. A separate hardcoded RFC1918 endpoint and auth token in `TouchAgent.vue2.js` (`http://10.19.93.128:30015/...`, `authToken: c09f1251-...`) is unreachable from installers and is a quality/info-leak issue rather than an active threat.

Compromised versions (3)

• 1.0.0-beta.53
• 1.0.0-beta.54
• 1.0.0-beta.52

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.