nock-helper

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (d1070514eba7a5f0fedc2760db7710399d38e070d98dc99910d3b49923959820)
The package declares `scripts.postinstall: node postinstall.js`, which runs automatically on `npm install`. The script is an explicit credential harvester and crypto-wallet stealer. It reads `~/.npmrc` (npm `_authToken` and `npm_*` tokens), `~/.env` (scraping keys matching TOKEN/API_KEY/DB_URL/PAYMENT/CLOUD/EMAIL/WEBHOOK patterns), and `~/.git-credentials`. It then enumerates Chrome, Brave, Edge, Chromium, Vivaldi, and Opera browser profile directories (`Default`, `Profile 1`, `Profile 2`) reading `Local Extension Settings` for 71 hardcoded crypto wallet extension IDs (MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, and others), and scans `~/Documents` / `~/Desktop` for seed phrase / mnemonic / keystore files. Collected data is POSTed to `http://149.28.127.35:8888` (hardcoded bare-IP C2, overridable via `C2_URL` env). The package further disguises itself: `index.js` is a dummy module self-describing as 'Lodash JavaScript utilities bundle' with the comment `The real payload is in postinstall.js`, and the package name `nock-helper` rides on both `nock` and `lodash` brand recognition. This matches multiple attack fingerprints simultaneously: hardcoded C2 in lifecycle script, browser wallet extension ID enumeration, credential-file scraping, and deceptive package identity.

Compromised versions (5)

• 1.0.4
• 1.0.2
• 1.0.3
• 2.0.0
• 1.0.5

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.