exxpress-tool

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (378e423b00c08a371fbae1c77360685d2277e502e9875caa53fb20f58a39f396)
The package name `exxpress-tool` is a one-character edit of the widely-used `express` package. On `npm install`, the declared `scripts.postinstall` runs `postinstall.js`, which reads `~/.npmrc` (extracting `_authToken` and `npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}` tokens), `~/.git-credentials`, and `~/.env` (matching env-var names against token/secret/password/api/aws/azure/gcp/stripe/slack patterns and EVM private-key shapes), bundles the results together with `os.hostname()` and `os.userInfo()`, and POSTs the JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://149.28.127.35:8888` over plain HTTP. The same script iterates a hardcoded list of ~71 Chrome/Brave/Edge crypto-wallet extension IDs (MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Trust, Exodus, Ledger Live, Trezor, etc.), reads each wallet's `Local Extension Settings` LevelDB `.log` files, and regex-matches on `vault`, `mnemonic`, `seed`, `privateKey`, `encrypted`. It also recursively walks `~/Documents`, `~/Desktop`, `~/Downloads`, `~/OneDrive`, `~/Dropbox`, and `~/Google Drive` searching for BIP-39 seed phrases and `0x`-prefixed private keys. The advertised library code (`index.js`) is an empty stub; the author's own in-source comments (`The real payload is in postinstall.js`, `Silent. Zero trace.`, `Token harvester + Crypto wallet scanner`) confirm intent. Any developer or CI environment that installs this package will have npm publish tokens, git credentials, environment secrets, and browser wallet data shipped to the attacker.

Compromised versions (3)

• 1.0.0
• 1.0.5
• 1.0.2

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.