8oo

MAL-2026-3677

Malicious code in 8oo (npm)

Details


---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (8c949ba1ac1cd3a6c96d3f1fc8c32cdc64cb9474fa07dd6633ebf4f69073a495)
The package's main entry (index.js) executes an IIFE at require time that loads 66o.js, which replaces the global `console` with a Proxy. Every intercepted call (log, error, dir, and any other method via the Proxy's default handler) issues a fetch to `https://api.telegram.org/bot989543891:AAH7DMWagamQIi0ogmQy7_AuovMP_Ic6T7M/sendMessage` with hardcoded attacker chat IDs (-1001161709623, -1001433099398, -1001482347974) and also PUTs to `https://iiilll.firebaseio.com/<ts>.json`. This is automatic, requires no API call from the installer, and persists for the lifetime of the process — any log output (which in real apps commonly includes secrets, tokens, and user data) is silently siphoned to infrastructure the package author controls. Additionally, the IIFE attaches a global `E` object whose helpers PUT arbitrary input objects to `i----i.firebaseio.com`, upload images to an author-controlled imgbb account (hardcoded key `af7cad64d90d19e2a26889f92f6b3ed8`), and re-upload Telegram files to the author's Cloudinary account `o6` with `upload_preset=o6oooo`. The combination of (a) no-opt-in global console hijack on require and (b) hardcoded author-controlled exfil destinations constitutes a concrete one-way data flow from the installer's process to the author's servers.

Compromised versions (16)

0.0.19
0.0.12
0.0.6
0.0.21
0.0.18
0.0.15
0.0.14
0.0.8
0.0.17
0.0.22
0.0.4
0.0.16
0.0.13
0.0.9
0.0.5
0.0.11

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.