whalibmob

Details

This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical
forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into
the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW
query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter
JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the
victim's account to channels it never asked to join.

The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques
observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code
array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote
JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change
after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying
mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after
connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per
fork.

The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and
subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish
persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.

Affected package: whalibmob (npm), version(s): 5.33.5, 5.33.4, 5.33.3, 5.33.2, 5.32.2, 5.32.1, 5.32.0, 5.30.0, 5.29.6, 5.29.5, 5.29.4, 5.29.3, 5.29.2, 5.29.1, 5.29.0, 5.28.0, 5.25.0, 5.24.2, 5.24.1, 5.24.0.

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (091dbfc5e015710d33beb4bb706ba3bf44808312ba9f4e68b6bb389225d14911)
Pattern-based rules matched keyword co-occurrences in several files of this package: lib/MediaService.js imports fs/http/https and performs fs.readFileSync and https.request calls; lib/Registration.js contains the token 'ping' at multiple lines; lib/WebVersion.js references 'curl' and uses https.get alongside 'ps' tokens; and lib/socks.js references 'curl', 'POST', and 'hostname'. None of these matches, on their own, demonstrates reading installer-side secrets (such as ~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.npmrc, environment credential variables, browser profile stores, or wallet files) and sending them to an attacker-controlled destination, nor install-time code execution of fetched content, nor a backdoor channel. No lifecycle script (preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare) is cited as invoking the flagged code paths at install time. No hardcoded attacker C2 endpoint, no known-bad-infrastructure host, no obfuscated destination, and no credential-grade file read is identified in the available evidence. The package name's similarity to common library naming conventions and the presence of generic network/filesystem primitives are not themselves attack indicators.

Compromised versions (30)

• 5.33.5
• 5.33.4
• 5.33.3
• 5.33.2
• 5.32.2
• 5.32.1
• 5.32.0
• 5.30.0
• 5.29.6
• 5.29.5
• 5.29.4
• 5.29.3
• 5.29.2
• 5.29.1
• 5.29.0
• 5.28.0
• 5.25.0
• 5.24.2
• 5.24.1
• 5.24.0
• 5.33.18
• 5.33.30
• 5.33.28
• 5.33.23
• 5.33.19
• 5.33.20
• 5.33.29
• 5.33.26
• 5.33.22
• 5.33.21

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.