snap-queue

Details

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## Source: amazon-inspector (e0bb29642def9150e89bacf4da4e1a64f7bc972cd145053cbb0feee0baa768f3)
The sdist's setup.py defines a `_wus_boot()` function that is invoked at module top-level before `setup(...)`, so it runs automatically on `pip install snap-queue`. The function uses `subprocess.Popen` to launch `pythonw.exe` (replacing `python.exe` in `sys.executable`) running a sibling file `_snapqueue_core.py` with `creationflags=0x08000000` (CREATE_NO_WINDOW), and wraps the whole call in a blanket `try/except: pass`. Standard modules are aliased under underscore names (`_os`, `_sys`, `_sp`) to reduce visual prominence. The launched `_snapqueue_core.py` is undocumented in README and package metadata and is unrelated to the advertised FIFO-queue functionality. The combined shape — install-time execution, deliberate console-window suppression on Windows, error-swallowing, and detachment of the child from the pip process — is a hidden install-time stager that hands control on the installer's machine to undocumented sibling code the moment the package is installed.

## Source: kam193 (62bf582784fd41b3484157f6454ddcb6ab2ae10a5d93abeb19a5bfa5642b7e64)
During installation, the package attempts to silently execute code. In analyzed versions, the payload file was missing.


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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-09-snap-queue


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Compromised versions (1)

• 1.0.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.