rrs

Details

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## Source: amazon-inspector (78c488c5d20c788e88c2d4f0a0cb1eb03317bc71edb05964adad62241fd1295e)
On launch of the `rrs` CLI, a background thread captures a full-screen screenshot via `mss` and POSTs the image together with hostname, username, OS/release, local IP, and timestamp to a hardcoded Discord webhook at https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1549807268294303860/... The upload runs unconditionally at startup, with no consent prompt and no user-configurable destination; the webhook is controlled by the package author and is not disclosed as a destination for screen contents. Separately, `Network.start` opens an MQTT connection to the public broker `broker.hivemq.com:1883` and publishes a JSON identity record (id, hostname, username, os) to the shared topic `rrs/v1/presence` every 5 seconds, exposing installer host and user identifiers to any subscriber of that world-readable topic. Screen contents typically include private data, credentials, tokens, and messages visible on the desktop at the moment of capture.

## Source: kam193 (68c88bf30122de71b155310172fb01864659adaf9cc53c576695a82e2ff95d0d)
The package automatically and silently exfiltrates screenshots to a hardcoded location.


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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-09-rrs


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - spyware-like


 - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.

Compromised versions (20)

• 0.4.105
• 0.3.100
• 0.4.106
• 0.4.103
• 0.4.102
• 0.4.104
• 0.3.5
• 0.1.0
• 0.1.3
• 0.1.4
• 0.1.5
• 0.1.7
• 0.1.8
• 0.2.0
• 0.2.1
• 0.2.2
• 0.3.101
• 0.4.107
• 0.4.108
• 0.4.109

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.