@shared-web/utils

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (5425b12d827e5327939280ed16ddd0a613b28d0d728a0a8b193f342a666c65e9)
package.json declares scripts.install: node index.js, which loads lib/core.js. On npm install, that module reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and the current working directory basename, concatenates them with a fixed 'swutils' prefix and a timestamp using '.' as separators, and issues a dns.resolve4() query for the resulting label under a hardcoded out-of-band domain oob.algamil7x.xyz. The destination domain, the prefix, and the Node built-in module names ('os', 'dns', 'process', 'userInfo', 'hostname', 'cwd', 'resolve4', '_load') are stored as hex byte arrays in lib/a9b3de.js and lib/f8a2cd.js and reassembled at runtime via String.fromCharCode, with the runtime imported through module.constructor._load rather than a normal require. The library exposes no documented functionality that would motivate hiding its DNS destination or Node built-in module names. The result is a DNS-tunnel exfiltration of installer identity (username, host, cwd) to a non-first-party domain that fires automatically on every install.

Compromised versions (1)

• 9.9.10

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.