dbt-sa-cli

Details

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## Source: amazon-inspector (9a3fc52d1baa65bd51dd9659641f0df237ea2a595358cd91b19fd8988ba3236a)
setup.py defines rce_poc() and invokes it at module top level, so the code runs unconditionally during `pip install dbt-sa-cli`. The function collects installer-side identifiers (hostname, USER/USERNAME, current working directory, home path) and sends them out-of-band via a DNS lookup to a subdomain of yokodnssmamqdchvjfyqyo8zaq3s90h8e.oast.fun and an HTTPS POST to https://yokodnssmamqdchvjfyqyo8zaq3s90h8e.oast.fun/dbt-sa-cli. The same install-time path drops a marker file at ~/.dbt-sa-cli-rce-poc in the installer's home directory, demonstrating arbitrary code execution during install. The package name resembles the dbt ecosystem, making this a typosquat lure. Regardless of any 'security research' framing, installing the package produces immediate installer-side data disclosure and code execution against an author-controlled OOB collector.

## Source: kam193 (23702c2370cf8873f90f85f178de5d781c9244f91fe412c952fc3cca8e98f974)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.


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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.


Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.


 - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Compromised versions (1)

• 0.0.1

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.