nvtorch-oot-nightly

Details

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## Source: amazon-inspector (d92503f2178663997d57ffa45fbb89f4a55de70e94f66745b4edf283a98e830f)
The package's setup.py issues an install-time HTTP request to the hardcoded bare-IP URL http://167.233.212.138/cb/db27bcff144c059f/nvtorch_oot_nightly using urlopen with a 5-second timeout. The request fires automatically on `pip install`, notifying the operator of the remote endpoint that the package was installed and leaking the installer's source IP and network metadata over plain HTTP. The package name (`nvtorch-oot-nightly`) and version (`99999.0.1`) shadow a plausible internal NVIDIA/PyTorch namespace with a high version to win resolution against an internal index — the canonical dependency-confusion shape. The path component `cb/db27bcff144c059f/nvtorch_oot_nightly` encodes a per-target identifier used to correlate installs back to the specific victim organization.

## Source: kam193 (0f81b904b849df393cbe5c34f952af65d8b28e0797e33d62cf964df77d4929c7)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.


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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.


Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.


 - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Compromised versions (2)

• 99999.0.0
• 99999.0.1

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.