redis-type-xyz

Details

The redis-type-xyz package is an empty impersonation of Redis OM. It copies the redis-om-node repository, homepage, author, documentation, and declared dist/index.js entry point, but the published archive does not contain the declared dist directory or any usable implementation. Its dependency list replaces the legitimate ulid package used by Redis OM with ulid-xyz@^2.12.2.

Installing redis-type-xyz therefore installs the known-malicious ulid-xyz dependency. The ulid-xyz postinstall hook launches a detached background agent that decodes a WebSocket and HTTP C2 endpoint at 95.216.232.162:8010. The agent supports system information collection, drive and directory enumeration, removal, and deploy_binary tasks. deploy_binary writes attacker-supplied Base64 content to disk, registers persistence on Windows, macOS, or Linux, and launches the replacement agent. The malicious ulid-xyz dependency is independently tracked as MAL-2026-6672. redis-type-xyz is a separate delivery package that intentionally substitutes the known-malicious dependency into an otherwise copied Redis OM manifest.

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## Source: amazon-inspector (c9c8e39757a709b00e180a43959cd14e8cd36922e2f3b9a19f75046bd79e767c)
Package is published as 'redis-type-xyz' but its README markets itself as 'redis-type-os', uses Redis branding/logo, and declares its repository as github:redis/redis-om-node — impersonating Redis's official redis-om library. The package's package.json declares main as 'dist/index.js' and types as './dist/index.d.ts', but no dist/ directory is present in the tarball, so require('redis-type-xyz') will throw MODULE_NOT_FOUND. The package is not a functional library. Its only on-install effect is dependency resolution: it declares a runtime dependency on 'ulid-xyz' (^2.12.2), a name-confusion variant of the legitimate 'ulid' package. Any consumer installing redis-type-xyz will transitively pull ulid-xyz from an unrelated publisher. The naming pattern (impersonation of a well-known library + a sibling 'xyz'-suffixed dep mirroring a popular package) is a name-confusion / namespace-lure shape, but the contents of ulid-xyz itself were not analyzed in this record and no installer-harm payload (exfiltration, install hooks, credential reads) is observed in the parent package's tarball. Routing to human review to assess intent of the ulid-xyz transitive and the impersonation pattern.

Compromised versions (1)

• 1.10.6

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.