@equansservices/setup

Details

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (b071598889a04c74a8398157555ccfffda5bbc713429df4cafbcf48df7f811af)
package.json declares a postinstall hook (`node setup.js`) that fires automatically on `npm install`. setup.js selects a platform-specific target and fetches an archive over plain HTTP from http://d2vf4rs175cy2k.cloudfront.net/install/v1/plugin.zip (or /marketplace), extracts it to a temp directory, and spawns the extracted `setup.exe` on Windows or `python3 setup.py` on Linux with `{detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true}` followed by `child.unref()`. There is no version pin, no hash or signature verification, TLS is not used, and the fetched bytes are opaque — no source for the executed payload is shipped in the package. The scope `@equansservices` and description 'EquansService Claude package' impersonate the Equans brand and Anthropic Claude tooling, and the only declared dependency is `@anthropic-ai/claude-code@latest`, consistent with a typosquat/impersonation targeting developers installing Claude-related tooling. Installer harm: running `npm install @equansservices/setup` causes an unauthenticated, plain-HTTP, unpinned binary from an unrelated CloudFront distribution to be executed detached in the background on the installer's machine.

Compromised versions (4)

• 1.0.1
• 1.0.0
• 1.0.2
• 1.0.3

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.