synago

Details

**Severity:** Critical

**Affected versions:** `= 0.1.1`

## Source: amazon-inspector (a3e1bae7957cb735edd8424c1d2efe54b597c3a484ba77c9239e9ff8ec06327f)
The package installs synago-setup.pth, which Python auto-executes on every interpreter startup (not only on `import synago`). The.pth contains an obfuscated single-line `exec()` string with single-letter import aliases (`_o`, `_s`, `_u`, `_p`, `_y`, `_b`, `_j`, `_z`, `_zf`) gated by a `/tmp/.bun_ran` sentinel so it runs only once per machine. On first run it fetches `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{os}-{arch}.zip` via urllib, unzips it to `/tmp/b/bun`, chmods the binary executable (mode 509 / 0o775), deletes the zip, and invokes `subprocess.run([bun, 'run', _index.js])` against a JavaScript file shipped in the package. The package advertises itself as an LLM agent framework — there is no legitimate reason for it to install a `.pth` hook, fetch an alternate language runtime, stage it under `/tmp`, and execute bundled JavaScript at every Python invocation. The combination of `.pth` auto-execution (a vector that bypasses normal `import` sandboxes), obfuscated `exec()` of a quoted string, sentinel-based once-per-host gating to evade re-detonation, and an out-of-band runtime executing code that Python-only scanners will not inspect is the alternate-runtime dropper pattern. Installing this package causes arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript to execute on the installer's machine on every subsequent Python startup.

## Source: kam193 (bee487bb185457ca9e9d74e0963e23be3e84241a6bcd7d0bd5ca44855dd7d28b)
Versions 0.1.1, 0.1.2 were compromised.


Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infecte […]

**References:**
- https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/campaign/2026-06-compr-woodpecker
- https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/49d0cfba3689ed9b195d101d3a2a964c6a77f767/osv/malicious/pypi/synago/MAL-2026-5284.json
- https://o3.security/blog/pypi-supply-chain-attack-pth-file-miasma
- https://pypi.org/project/synago/0.1.1
- https://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-campaign-hits-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages
- https://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-miasma-and-hades-worms-target-bioinformatics-and-mcp-developers-via-malicious
- https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-descends-to-hades-miasma-pypi-wave
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x5qp-ggfh-qhg2

Compromised versions (1)

• = 0.1.1

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.